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ABSTRACT 
 
Title of Dissertation: A Study on Ship’s routeing and Port zoning Audit Scheme 
for eradicating or reducing circumstantial factors of 
marine casualties and incidents 
 
 
Degree:   MSc  
 
This dissertation is a study on Ship’s routeing and Port zoning Audit Scheme (SPAS) 
for eradicating or reducing risky circumstantial factors of marine casualties and 
incidents in coastal waters. It aims to show methods of preventing marine accident 
from the human element, and to discuss the further development for the maritime 
safety system of the Republic of Korea as the world’s first compulsory scientific 
audit scheme on ship’s routeing and port zoning.  
At the outset, this study intended to review the statistics of marine accidents to 
analyse which causes and places should be focused on to secure maritime safety. It 
also attempted to analyse serious marine accidents which occurred in ports and 
approaches. This was to demonstrate which tools were applied successfully to reduce 
marine accidents caused by the human element. A controversy over a harbour bridge 
was introduced to prove the importance of objective ship handling simulation.  
The STCW, Navigational Aids, the ISM Code and the User-Centred Design were 
studied as methods of reducing human errors in error enforcing circumstances. To 
verify that the IMO’s safety measures on the human element are corresponding to all 
categories of human errors, the Marine Casualty Investigation Code of the IMO was 
referred to. It was found that the IMO could contribute further to preparing any 
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appropriate measures to deal with the loose interface between liveware and the 
environment, in other words, navigators and the navigational circumstances. 
Accordingly, it reviewed the schemes of several maritime States that were relevant to 
safety of navigation in ports and approaches. As a successful example, the SPAS of 
the Republic of Korea was analysed. The SPAS is evaluated in Korea as an effective 
risk finding system in port design and its operation, and a tool for providing the 
navigators in coastal waters with a better navigational environment. In addition, from 
the shore-based perspectives, the SPAS has reduced social disputes over maritime 
safety and accelerated economic construction of infrastructures.  
Despite of the successful implementation of the SPAS project, some issues are still 
open. Chapter 5.5 provides the future direction of the SPAS system as the world’s 
first compulsory scientific audit scheme on ship’s routeing and port zoning. Also it 
contains some recommendations to policy planners for achieving efficient port 
construction and management taking into account safe navigation. Ultimately, this 
dissertation aimed to study how human error as a principal causation factor would 
not turn in marine accidents in heavy traffic zones such as coastal waters. 
At the end, it is reiterated that the human element and navigator-friendly 
circumstances should be considered together in order to reduce marine accidents in 
coastal waters, to protect the marine environment and to save human lives at sea. 
 
KEY WORDS: Ship’s routeing and Port zoning Audit Scheme (SPAS), Marine 
Casualties and Incidents, Marine Accident Investigation, Statistics of Marine 
Accidents, Human Element (HE), Human Error, SHEL Model, Liveware, User-
Centred Design (UCD) 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Marine accidents are pieces of evidence that prove failure of maritime safety systems. 
Therefore, lessons learned from failures could be useful or perfect solutions to reduce 
the likelihood of such failures recurring in the future.  
Although every system, natural or manufactured, is not relieved of failure (Frankel, 
1987), the human element is considered to be a major contributor in terms of cause of 
marine accidents. The proportion of human error causing marine accident varies from 
65% to 96% according to scholars worldwide (Kim H.T., 2012). Korean statistics of 
marine accident agrees that about 80% of accidents are caused by operating errors1 
such as deficiency of sailing readiness, negligence of position fixing, violation of 
navigation rules and regulations, negligence of watch-keeping, negligence of safety 
working rules and so on. Furthermore, 97% of collisions, 92% of contacts2 and 89% of 
groundings are caused by operating errors3. The operating errors could be rewritten as 
errors conducted by operators. In other words, operating errors would be equal to 
human errors such as slips, lapses, mistakes or violations according to classification by 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO, 1997).  
                                                 
1 Marine Accident Statistics Book of the Korea Maritime Safety Tribunal (KMST) indicates that 82.9% 
of the marine accidents in the period of 2006-2011 are caused by the operating errors. Detailed 
statistics would be mentioned in Chapter 2. 
 
2 Marine Accident Investigation and Judgement Act (MAIAJ) of Korea distinguishes “Contact” from 
Collision”. Collision is ship-to-ship accident, and Contact is ship-to-unmovable object accidents 
(MAIAJ Ordinance article 13). 
 
3 Marine Accident Statistics Book (2006-2011) of the KMST indicates that 96.9 % of collisions, 91.9% 
of contacts and 88.5% of groundings are caused by operational errors. Detailed statistics would be 
dealt in Chapter 2. 
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First of all, human error should be primarily focused on to prevent failure of safety 
systems because it is a principal causation factor in maritime accidents. Around 70% 
of marine accidents occurred in territorial waters4 such as ports, approaching channels 
and anchorages. It is the coastal waters that should be interesting for safety purposes. 
Moreover, modern ships are getting bigger or faster to achieve economy of scale, 
which exerts baleful influence on the fixed or confined navigable waters. In addition, 
artificial water facilities including mooring buoys and anchorages beside ship’s routes 
could act as obstacles to safe navigation because they limit navigable waters. These 
obstacles are generally built in coastal areas, which could be risky factors that are not 
easily found in the high seas. 
Consequently, facilities in coastal waters as hindrance to safe navigation should be 
scientifically surveyed and analysed to root out or mitigate potential hazards as much 
as possible before deciding or changing the port design or ship’s routeing such as 
Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS), one-way routes and Inshore Traffic Zone (ITZ). 
Port zoning is also an important part of port design, which can contribute to 
minimizing hazards and to promoting safe working. Safe working in the proper order 
lessens the possibility of accidental spillages and consequent pollution (IAPH, 1991).  
Supposing that human errors could not be totally eradicated because seafarers on 
board might suffer from more fatigue in port and approaches when arriving in, 
berthing at, working in, and departing from ports (IMO, 1997a)5 . Further design 
                                                 
4 Marine Accident Statistics Book (2007-2011) of the KMST indicated that 70.12% accidents occurred 
in territorial waters that are not limited to Korean territorial waters. 
(unit: %) 
Waters＼Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average (5 years) 
Territorial Waters 75.80 70.21 60.30 68.79 75.48 70.12 
Others 24.20 29.79 39.70 31.21 24.52 29.88 
 
5 IMO. (1997, November 27). ANNEX: GUIDEL1NES FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF HUMAN FACTORS IN 
MARINE CASUALTIES AND INCIDENTS para. 1.2 (Res.A.849(20)). London: Author. 
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deficiencies and erroneous assumptions can lead to failure of systems by the human 
element (Frankel, 1987). Safety-friendly navigational circumstances in error enforcing 
zones that could give more room for absorbing human errors would be one solution to 
reduce or break down the possibility of marine accidents.  
This study intends to depict what the IMO should address further on dealing with 
human error by using the method of the Casualty Investigation Code6. In accordance 
with the SHEL7 Model of the Code, the interfaces between Liveware and other factors 
such as Software, Hardware, Liveware and Environment should be studied to search 
for the existence of the IMO solutions in the field of the above four interfaces.  
In addition, this dissertation will refer to several failures of safety systems such as 
marine accidents and near misses, and it will mention a controversy over the span of a 
harbour bridge that ended in blocking the passage of VLCCs in an approaching 
channel. Most references will be based on marine accident investigation reports of the 
Republic of Korea and journals. However, when it comes to lessons learned from the 
above examples, the final report of the investigating authority will be the best but not 
the last. The actions taken by related authorities to prevent recurrence of similar 
accidents will be consulted as one of the practical lessons learned.  
As practical lessons learned to absorb human errors in dense traffic zone, the Ship’s 
routeing and Port zoning Audit Scheme (SPAS) of Korea will be mainly analysed 
because it might be c compulsory audit scheme for relieving or preventing human 
error from evolving into marine accidents in congested areas. Therefore, the related 
examples of maritime States would be introduced. Effects and results of the Korean 
                                                                                                                                             
 
6 IMO. (2008, May 16). ADOPTION OF THE CODE OF THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND 
RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR A SAFETY INVESTIGATION INTO A MARINE CASUALTY 
OR MARINE INCIDENT (MSC 84/24/Add.1). London: Author. 
 
7 SHEL: Software, Hardware, Environment, and Liveware. 
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compulsory scheme will be also examined so as to suggest improvements in the 
procedures and framework of the scheme.  
Under the above studies, this dissertation deals with a newly developed safety system 
learned from mishaps in the Republic of Korea. It will provide a model case of how 
human error could be prevented from developing into marine accidents based on the 
experience from the SPAS. Furthermore, it is expected that this dissertation will be 
beneficial to not only Korea but also the coastal States that consider effective 
enhancing coastal safety with a view to allocating limited administrative efforts.  
1.2 Objectives   
The objectives of this dissertation are to analyse the importance of the human element 
on marine accidents by illustrating statistics published by the Korea Maritime Safety 
Tribunal (KMST). Moreover, as most accidents occur in coastal waters, safety-
friendly navigational circumstances could be one of the serviceable solutions to reduce 
or break down the possibility of accident recurrence in coastal waters. As a way to 
prevent similar accidents from recurring, the SPAS will be introduced as a method to 
hinder the evolution of human errors to marine accidents in busy traffic areas.  
In order to achieve the objectives, this dissertation will: 
 Examine and review the statistics of marine accidents to understand what 
the main causes of marine accidents are, and where the vulnerable sea 
areas are; 
 Analyse IMO’s approaches to the human element under error enforcing 
conditions; 
 Introduce the background events of the mandatory Ship’s routeing and 
Port zoning Audit Scheme of Korea; 
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 Illustrate the SPAS of Korea with relative examples of other States;  
 Review the SPAS taking into account navigator-friendly design; and 
 Suggest improving the procedure and framework of the SPAS 
1.3 Scope of the Study  
This research work consists of 7 chapters. Chapter 1 gives the background, objectives, 
scope and methodology of the study. 
Chapter 2 analyses marine accident statistics to find out which is the most noticeable 
cause of accidents. It reviews the 5 year statistics of the Republic of Korea together 
with relevant statistics. 
Chapter 3 describes selected approaches of the IMO to the human element. It discusses 
the tools to deal with the human element on board such as the ISM Code and User-
Centred Design. The tools will be compared with the SHEL Model to find out which 
aspects of the Model should be paid more concern.  
Chapter 4 investigates the scheme for user-friendly navigational circumstances that 
was introduced after serious marine accidents, and debates on design of harbour 
bridges in the Republic of Korea. It also discusses the background of the new scheme 
for the social agreement on building marine facilities over navigable waters. 
Chapter 5 reviews the instruments of maritime States for ensuring safety at port and 
approaches. It also describes the differences between the current instruments of 
maritime States and the SPAS of Korea. The overview, advantages and shortcomings 
of the SPAS will be scrutinized to show its effectiveness and further improvement.  
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Chapter 6 summarizes the conclusion with perspectives and utility of the audit scheme 
as a way to block the holes between the human element and marine accidents. 
1.4 Methodology and Sources of Information 
This research work was conducted aiming to seek the direction of the safe navigation 
taking into account navigator-friendly circumstances. To achieve the research 
objectives, the methodology was mixed with qualitative and quantitative analysis.  
The qualitative analysis mainly focused on the review of the SPAS of Korea and 
relevant examples of maritime States on ship’s routeing and port zoning. The 
collection and review of relevant reports, documents, legislations and journals 
regarding circumstantial factors of navigation and the legal framework of the SPAS 
were also undertaken. To investigate the background of the SPAS, investigation 
reports of marine accidents were reviewed. To add practical issues in this discussion, 
data collecting from conference proceedings, official meeting reports and public 
hearings for the last five years were carried out.  
On the other hand, the quantitative analysis concentrated on marine accident data to 
calculate which sector should be interesting for efficient enforcement of administrative 
power. It needs not only typical data such as the distribution of casualties per accident 
categories but also detailed statistics which presents causes of accidents. Therefore, 
the up-to-date statistics of the KMST were analysed because the KMST provides 
detailed data and on-demand statistics for a relatively long time period. Especially, the 
statistics of causes and contributing factors regarding accident categories were deeply 
assayed. Also, relevant cases of other authorities were referred to in order to find out 
each ratio of factors that contributed to marine accidents. 
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2 MARINE ACCIDENT STATISTICS  
2.1 Introduction 
The reason why States investigate a marine accident is to find out the cause of the 
accident 8 . The Casualty Investigation Code of the IMO also describes that the 
objective of investigation is to prevent marine casualties and marine incidents in the 
future. Most member States of the IMO are known to follow the Casualty 
Investigation Code9. As a matter of course, the objective of the KMST, an independent 
investigation authority of Korea, is also to prevent recurrences of marine accidents10, 
although the role of the KMST does not perfectly coincide with the objective of the 
Casualty Investigation Code11. 
The investigation authorities publish reports on the investigated marine accidents. 
Generally, the final report contains “Lessons Learned” in the form of safety 
recommendations. The investigation authorities also publicize the statistics of 
accidents on a regular basis. 
                                                 
8 Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation (BSU). Website of BSU. Retrieved August 16, 
2012 from the World Wide Web: http://www.bsu-
bund.de/cln_030/nn_88782/sid_EB5B93E05F8781AA62C43A92DEB8C671/nsc_true/EN/Home/hom
epage__node.html?__nnn=true   
 
Marine Accident Investigation Branch. About us: What we do. Retrieved August 16, 2012 from the 
World Wide Web: http://www.maib.gov.uk/about_us/index.cfm 
 
9 The international forum of investigators (MAIIF) pledged to support IMO's role in advancing 
maritime safety and pollution prevention, and contributed to the development of the Casualty 
Investigation Code. Retrieved August 16, 2012 from the World Wide Web: http://www.maiif.net 
 
10 Korean Maritime Safety Tribunal (KMST). Function. Retrieved August 16, 2012 from the World 
Wide Web: http://www.kmst.go.kr/eng/cms/cms.asp?code=BA 
 
11 The Code recommends not to apportion blame or determine liability, but the KMST determine 
liability by request of persons in charge of the accidents. (Source: Maritime Accident Investigation 
and Judgment Act amended in 1998, article 4.2)  
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Each individual report could play an important role to enhance maritime safety. For 
example, M/V Estonia12 capsized in the Baltic Sea on 28 September 1994 because of 
detachment of the bow door13. It is evaluated that the investigation report of the 
accident contributed to revision of the SOLAS14 for enhancement of the safety of life 
at sea as much as the sinking of the passenger ship Titanic on 15 April 1012. Actually, 
there has been no accident caused by detachment of the bow door after the revision of 
the SOLAS. It implies that the IMO’s involvement based on the investigation were 
successful to avoid recurrence of similar accidents. However, it should be highlighted 
that the human element was also one of the major contributing factors of the capsizing. 
 
Table 1: Marine Accidents per Ship’s Type 
Year＼Ship Passenger ship Cargo ship Oil tanker Tug boat Others Fishing boat Total 
2007 13 96 31 55 69 495 759 
2008 19 63 25 52 42 435 636 
2009 7 83 18 35 47 725 915 
2010 18 107 17 46 58 672 775 
2011 17 96 37 75 84 888 1,197 
Total 74 445 153 282 299 3,215 4,468 
(Source: KMST, 2012. p.6) 
In addition, the statistics of marine accidents are as much important and useful as 
individual reports because the statistics can show what the trends of the marine 
accidents are, and what the common causes of accidents are. Pursuant to the statistics 
                                                 
12 Ship’s names in this study are italicised just for easy reading. 
 
13 Joint Accident Investigation Commission was set up on 29 September 1994 among Governments of 
Estonia, Finland and Sweden, and carried out the investigation (Source: Final report of the accident) 
 
14 SOLAS: International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea  
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made out for a certain period, safety authorities can sort out the main failures of a 
safety system, and concentrate on complementary measures to cure the system failure.  
Table 1 is a typical table of marine accident statistics which sketches exemplarily the 
distribution of casualties per ship categories for the recent 5 years in Korea. It is 
evident that fishing vessels are especially responsible for the recorded casualty number. 
Furthermore, it shows the trends of accidents per multiple vessel types.  
 
 
Figure 1: Analysis by Category of Casualty, 2007-2011 (excluding fishing boat) 
(Source: Author edited based on Table 1) 
Figure 1 is based on Table 1 by the author, which suggests that the accidents were 
decreasing from 2007 to 2009, and increasing from 2009. Oil tankers and tug boats 
mainly contributed to the upward move. It could present the need of subdividing the 
“Others” category because it is also going up. However, Table 1 could be in no 
position to disclose the actual causes that led to the accidents and to come up with 
conclusions to set up an affordable safety policy. Thus, other types of statistics are 
analysed in Chapter 2.2. 
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Conclusively, if the cause of an individual accident is found through investigation, the 
treatment can be anticipated to avoid similar accidents and to keep future safety. In 
addition, when the statistics show the increasing trends of accidents, it is a sign of 
requiring more attention of the safety authorities concerned.  
2.2 Analysis of Marine Accident Statistics 
2.2.1 Error made by Human Element  
Table 2 shows a 5 year term statistics on causes of marine accidents in Korea. Viewed 
in this light of chapter 2.1, what the statistics indicate should be analysed to find out 
which causes of accident need more attention. 
 
Table 2 Statistics of Marine Accident Causes (2007-2011) 
   Cause＼Type of 
Accdt. 
Collision Contact Grounding Fire or Explosion Sinking
Machinery
damage Distress
Death/ 
injury Others Total (%)
Operating 
Error 
Inadequate 
pre-sailing 
preparation 
- 1 - - 3 - - - 4 8 0.5
Insufficient  
hydrographic 
survey 
- 4 5 - - - - - - 9 0.6
Straying of 
designated 
course 
22 1 2 - 1 - - - 2 28 1.9
Negligence of 
fixing ship's 
position 
3 8 40 - - - - - 2 53 3.5
Unsuitable 
maneuvering 53 14 8 - 7 - - 1 6 89 5.9
Negligence of 
lookout 576 4 5 - - - - - - 585 38.8
Deficiency of 
preparation 
for and 
response of 
bad weather
10 - 8 1 18 - 2 2 20 61 4
Inappropriate 
anchoring and 
mooring 
- - 1 - - - - - 1 2 0.1
Violation of 
navigation 
rules 
221 1 - - - - - - 2 224 14.9
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Negligence of 
service 
countrol 
- - 1 - - - - - - 1 0.1
Negligence of 
watchkeeping 19 2 12 2 - 1 - - 3 39 2.6
Others 59 9 9 1 8 - - 4 5 95 6.3
Failed to 
follow safety 
working rules 
on board 
- - 1 5 1 - - 42 6 55 3.6
Sub Total 963 44 92 9 38 1 2 49 51 1,249 82.9
Percentage (%) 96.9 91.7 88.5 9.5 62.3 1.7 33.3 89.1 60.0 82.9 -
Poor 
Handing 
& 
Defects 
Poor handling 
of machinery, 
Poor handling 
of fire 
- - 3 2 5 1 2 - 2 15 1
Equipment, 
short circuit 3 - 1 15 2 56 1 - 4 82 5.4
Defects of hull 
or machinery - - - 59 1 - - - - 60 4
Sub Total 3 0 4 76 8 57 3 - 6 157 10.4
Others 
Deficiency of 
passengers 
embarkation 
or cargo 
stowage 
- - - 1 3 - - 1 17 22 1.5
Unfitness of 
ship operation 
management
1 - - 1 6 - - - 1 9 0.6
Unfitness of 
crew manning - - 1 - - - - - - 1 0.1
Unfit navi. 
aids - 1 1 - - - - - - 2 0.1
Act of god 5 - - - 2 - - - 1 8 0.5
Others 22 3 6 8 4 1 1 5 9 59 3.9
Sub Total 28 4 8 10 15 1 1 6 28 101 6.7
Total 994 48 104 95 61 59 6 55 85 1,507 100
(Source: KMST, 2012. p.26) 
In accordance with Table 2, the highest portion of causes is “Operating Error15” such 
as deficiency of sailing readiness, negligence of position fixing, violation of 
                                                 
15 The KMST does not define “operating error”. It might be used just for grouping the individual errors 
made by operators.  
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navigation rules and regulations and negligence of watch-keeping. The operating error 
is 82.9%. The “Operating Error” could be expressed as “Error made by Operator”. In 
other words, it is “Error caused by the Human Element (HE)” because seafarers made 
the operating errors. Conclusively, the operating error could be classified as one of 
human errors.  
 
Table 3: Analysis of Causes (including HE) for Marine Accidents (1981-1992) 
 
(Source: Oses, 2003) 
The percentage of 82.9% is quite the similar number of the preceding study on the 
human element affecting marine accidents. First, the IMO reported that more than 80% 
of marine accidents and incidents are owing to human error (Albayrak, 2009). Second, 
Table 3 shows a percentage of 74%, and relative analyses bring forth percentages from 
70% to 95% (with an average value of about 80%) for accidents in the maritime 
transport chain (Oses, 2003).  
In terms of main causes of accidents, the policy planning to reduce marine accidents 
from recurring in the future should concentrate on human elements. As analysed, it 
covers the highest percentage of causes of marine accidents.  
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2.2.2 Areas of Frequent Marine Accidents  
Table 4 depicts 29.9% of marine accidents16 happening in the high seas, for the time 
period 2007-2011. Over 70% of marine accidents occurred in territorial waters 
including port and approaches.  
 
Table 4: The Number of Marine Accidents regarding Areas 
Area＼Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Ports & 
Approaching 
channels 
Incheon 10 13 11 16 25 
Janghang, Kunsan 5 8 2 6 8 
Mokpo 4 2 4 0 3 
Yeosu, Kwangyang 5 6 3 1 4 
Samcheonpo, Tongyoung 2 7 11 1 2 
Masan, Jinhae 2 2 4 3 1 
Busan 13 10 25 21 15 
Okpo, Jangseungpo 3 4 6 0 0 
Ulsan, Pohang 9 4 4 10 4 
Donghae, Samcheok, Sokcho 3 4 6 5 0 
Cheju, Seoguipo 3 2 3 5 2 
Sub Total 59 62 79 68 64 
Percentage (%) 10.4 12.9 10.9 9.2 6.8 
Territorial 
seas 
East sea 42 46 69 56 98 
West sea 158 110 160 155 286 
South sea 158 117 118 192 256 
Japanese waters 12 2 10 36 10 
Sub Total 370 275 357 439 650 
Percentage (%) 65.4 57.3 49.4 59.6 68.7 
High seas 
East sea 65 78 136 96 79 
West sea 22 6 26 12 31 
South sea 15 23 68 53 62 
                                                 
16 The accident data is collected according to the reports from Korean flag vessels and Korean SAR area.  
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South East Asian area 24 32 56 38 44 
Others 11 4 1 31 16 
Sub Total 137 143 287 230 232 
Percentage (%) 24.2 29.8 39.7 31.2 24.5 
Total 566 480 723 737 946 
(Source: Author added percentage lines to the table of the KMST, 2012. p.3) 
In case of collision, Table 5 gives 76.5% as the percentages of collisions in coastal 
waters. It is evident that the risk of accidents in coastal waters is much higher than that 
in the high seas.  
In terms of places of concern as shown in Table 5, the likelihood of accidents is 
relatively higher in dense traffic areas, such as ports and approaching channels due to 
the ratio of traffic volume and confined geographic area. Therefore, geographically the 
first target of maritime safety should be coastal areas with a view to allocating limited 
administrative efforts. Therefore, from a managerial perspective, marine traffic 
management should put most of its emphasis on controlling traffic in the port zone and 
its approaches to avoid collisions that are the most common accidents when port 
traffic is dense (Yip, 2006). 
 
Table 5: Collision Sites 
Year＼Area Domestic Ports Foreign Ports Territorial seas High seas Total 
2007 14 0 54 22 90 
2008 19 4 43 21 87 
2009 24 0 41 22 87 
2010 20 0 52 20 92 
2011 10 0 58 19 87 
Total 87 4 248 104 443 
Percentage (%) 19.6 0.9 56.0 23.5 100.0 
(Source: Author added percentage lines to the table of the KMST, 2012. p.35) 
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2.3 Facts Learned from Statistics 
Human errors such as misjudgement and lack of attention are considered to cover 
about 80% of causes of marine accidents, and over 70 % of mishaps occur in coastal 
waters.  
From the viewpoint of efficient administration, the human element and coastal waters 
should be considered together since the vast majority of marine accidents occur in 
coastal waters by human errors. This should be viewed as the first target that needs 
extreme attention. Detailed designing and obligatory enforcement for maritime safety 
policy planners to reduce human errors or hinder human errors from evolving into 
accidents in coastal waters are therefore essential.  
The other chapters of this study will be unfolded from the analysed facts of the 
statistics. 
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3 SELECTED APPROACHES TO HUMAN ELEMENTS  
3.1 General  
Most of the significant IMO conventions were originated by serious marine accidents. 
As shown in Table 6, the SOLAS was established by the sinking of the passenger ship 
Titanic. Human element was also considered internationally due to the grounding and 
oil spill of the tanker Torrey Canyon.  
When it comes to the human element, training and education would be the first step. 
Thereupon, the IMO has developed significant conventions, resolutions and circulars 
regarding binding human elements with safe navigation. The first development was 
the STCW17 for training and education of seafarers on an international level, which 
was driven by the IMO resolution18 setting out the vision, principles, and goals for the 
human element in 1997 (IMO, 1997b). 
It contains manning, qualification, and licensing. However, the STCW was not a new 
scheme because most maritime States already had rules and regulations on training 
and education of seafarers, and several States regarded it as formalizing a system 
closely identical to their systems19. 
A highly important resolution on the human element was triggered by the capsizing of 
passenger ferry the Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987. It was the International Safety 
                                                 
17 The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 
(STCW), 1978 was adopted in 1978 and entered into force in 1984. Significant amendment was made 
in 1995.  
 
18 IMO. (1997, November 27). HUMAN ELEMENT VISION, PRINCIPLES AND GOALS FOR THE 
ORGANIZATION (A.850(20)). London: Author 
 
19 Consortium of Maritime Trainers of the U.S.. STCW:Home. Retrieved 9 September 2012 from the 
World Wide Web: http://www.stcw.org/big.html 
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Management (ISM) Code 20  which officially put managerial levels (liveware and 
software) ashore in the maritime safety system. 
 
Table 6: Major Accidents causing International Instruments 
Ship’s Name Year/Place of accident Abstract International Instrument 
Titanic 1912 North Atlantic  
Sinking.  
Loss of 1,503 lives SOLAS 
Torrey Canyon 1967 UK Dover Strait 
Grounding.  
Oil spill of 119,000 tons 
MARPOL 
STCW 
Herald of Free 
Enterprise  
1987 
Begium Zeebrugge 
Capsizing.  
Loss of 193 lives ISM Code 
Scandinavian Star 1990 North Sea 
Fire.  
Loss of 158 lives Accelerating ISM Code
(Source: Author) 
The cause of the Herald of Free Enterprise was related not to the design of the ship 
(hardware) but to fatigue of seafarers (liveware). No matter how the IMO has 
continuously improved ship’s hardware, certain marine accidents like the Herald of 
Free Enterprise, the Scandinavian Star were not linked to hardware but it was related 
to mistakes of human elements. In the case of the Herald of Free Enterprise, the steps 
to be taken to avoid a similar capsize in the future were proper procedures (software) 
for ensuring that the bow and stern doors are closed before proceeding to sea21.  
Accordingly, procedures for preliminary inspections are required to make up for the 
loopholes of the safety system, For example (Jun, 2004): 
                                                 
20 International Safety Management Code was adopted by the IMO through an amendment to the 
SOLAS Convention, Chapter IX (IMO, 1997) by resolution A.741(18) for the safe operation of ships 
and for pollution prevention. 
 
21 MAIB. (1987). FORMAL INVESTIGATION: MV Herald of Free Enterprise REPORT OF COURT 
NO. 8074. London: Author  
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 Designated seaman should tick off questions on the pre-sailing checklist 
including bow doors; and 
  Designated seaman should check the function of the indicator of bow 
door whether it is open or shut according to formal procedures. 
Within this context, every ship owner should establish a safety policy22 in the first 
place, then develop, implement and maintain a safety management system (SMS) for 
ensuring adequate management, safe operation for ships and environmental protection. 
Moreover, those systems should be approved by States23.   
It could be evaluated that the IMO developed conspicuous instruments regarding the 
combination of human elements on board and ashore with safe navigation and 
management matters. 
3.2 User-Centred Design 
3.2.1 Human-Machine Interface 
The Human-Machine Interface (HMI) aims to design an interactive part with 
efficiency between user and machine (Sanders, 1998). So, the user-friendly interactive 
part could contribute to reducing mistakes by human elements.  
If collision or grounding happened in dense fog by a ship whose radar was off, the 
officer of watch (OOW) might be blamed, and the cause of the accident could be 
“operating error” such as “violation of navigation rules and regulations”. The OOW 
                                                 
22 Another objective of the ISM Code is for satisfactory protection of marine and coastal environment 
but excluded in this study in order to focus on safe operation of ships. 
 
23 In most cases, Recognized Organizations are in charge of approval of the system instead of 
administrations.  
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could be blamed twice because of violation of navigation rules and regulations, and 
non-conformity with the ISM Code. However, it might have another solution except 
blaming the OOW for avoiding further occurrence of accidents when the radar was 
switched off by the OOW’s mistake. 
If the ship is equipped with old-fashioned radars that have several knobs such as 
dimmer dial, power dial, range dial and sea clutter24 dial, they are arranged on a panel 
beside the radar screen and the size and shape of the knobs are nearly the same or 
similar. When the OOW wants to turn counter-clockwise for more reflection on the 
radar screen, experienced navigators do not feel any confusion to find the sea clutter 
dial. If the power dial is just beside the sea clutter dial, any navigators could turn the 
power dial off instead of turning on the sea clutter dial in error enforcing circumstance. 
Supposing that the ship was sailing in the busy Malacca Strait just before One Fathom 
Bank in dense fog, the feasibility of a marine accident will be highly increased 
because the turned-off radar requires a warming-up period for operation. Actually, the 
author once turned off the power of the JRC radar by mistake in Dover Strait. Some 
colleagues had also mentioned the same mistake because the JRC radar was popular at 
that time.  
As a matter of fact, it is not easy to find investigation reports which depict HMI design 
failure. The above arrangement of dials could be a bad example in terms of the HMI. 
So, it would be a contributing factor to the accident that was caused by human error.  
In conclusion, human error might be a potential contributing factor of hardware. 
Therefore, the human error might not be a matter of the human itself and maritime 
training could not be the only answer while planning preventative measures for 
mistake.  
                                                 
24 Wave reflection adjustment 
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3.2.2 User-Centred Design 
The way to mitigate the human error explained in Chapter 3.2.1 would not be limited 
to the STCW or the ISM Code. The HMI between the radar and operator should be 
more considered. Not a few marine accidents could be evaded by the User-Centred 
Design (USD) because a poorly designed HMI could be a contributing factor to 
accidents.  
 
Figure 2: Human Centred Design Process 
(Source: Lindström & Malmsten, 2008) 
According to the International Standardization Organization (ISO) standard 13407 
(Human-centred design process), human-centred activities are included in the general 
process throughout a development life-cycle. As shown in Figure 2, there are four 
activities that consist of the main cycle of the UCD25:  
 First step, specifying the context of use; 
                                                 
25 User-entred Design (UCD) is an approach to design that grounds the process in information about the 
people who will use the product. UCD processes focus on users through the planning, design and 
development of a product.(Source: UPA) 
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 Second step, specifying requirements; 
 Third step, creating design solutions; and 
 Fourth step, evaluating design.  
It might not be needed to elaborate on the steps for the maritime community because 
the ISO already publicized the detailed guidelines on the UCD that is the ISO standard 
of human-centred design for interactive systems (ISO 9241-210:1010)26. Therefore, it 
would be beneficial to utilize the open standards in the maritime community 
concerning automation design such as integrated bridge system (IBS), Integrated 
Navigation System (INS) or e-Navigation.  
3.2.3 Application of the User-Centred Design 
There are several leading studies on the application of the UCD in the maritime 
community. Typical development has been performed by the ATOMOS27  project 
since 1992, which was driven by the EU for Integrated Ship Control (ISC). Ten 
organizations including European institutes, ship classification societies and 
universities joined and introduced the concept of the UCD for advancement of 
navigational safety (Kim H.T., 2012).  
                                                 
26 ISO 9241-210:2010 provides requirements and recommendations for human-centred design principles 
and activities throughout the life cycle of computer-based interactive systems. It is intended to be used 
by those managing design processes, and is concerned with ways in which both hardware and 
software components of interactive systems can enhance human–system interaction. (Source: ISO. 
Retrieved August 20, 2012 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=52075) 
 
27 ATOMOS (Advanced Technology to Optimize Manpower Onboard Ships, 1992~1994), ATOMOS II 
(Advanced Technology to Optimize Maritime Operational Safety, Integration, and Interface, 
1996~1998), ATOMOS IV(Advanced Technology to Optimize Manpower Onboard Ships, ~2005) 
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Major maritime States keep studying the HMI as a part of the UCD for navigational 
safety. For instance, Chalmers University of Technology in Sweden participated in the 
NACOS Platinum Project that was for developing the IBS on basis of the UCD, and 
human factors in the engine department have been analysed for enhancement in the 
design of the engine control room. The HORIZON28 project was for examining the 
fatigue of watch officers (Lützhöft, 2012). THALASSES 29  was a framework 
programme of the EU for adopting human element for evaluating the socio-economic 
impact of new technology in the maritime transportation system.  
 
 
Figure 3: Layout of the enhanced Conning Display of the NACOS Platinum INS 
(Source: Lützhöft, 2012) 
Figure 3 is a recent example of the UCD embodied equipment that was devised by an 
expert group including mariners and engineers by taking into account the end-user, 
humans on board, through exchanging expertise and experience (see Figure 4). 
                                                 
28 8 institutions participated in the HORIZON project that was supported by the EU. 3.78milion Euro 
invested for 2009-2011. 
  
29 New Technology in Maritime Transport Interacting with the Human Element : Assessment of Impacts 
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Figure 4: Brainstorming Board to devise INS screen 
(Source: Lützhöft, 2012) 
 
3.2.4 Quality Assurance System 
If the IMO or individual States decided to introduce the UCD for the navigational 
equipment, the Quality Assurance System (QAS) should be considered to check 
compliance of the UCD. When it comes to the QAS to check the adaptation of the ISO 
standards concerned, there are already many known tools even in the maritime 
community. For instance, the ISM Code is a type of QAS tools. The ISM auditor could 
check the document in compliance with the ISO standards for the target equipment or 
factories.  
As a matter of fact, the e-Navigation system or the Integrated Bridge System (INS) 
could be one of the targets of the UCD and the QAS. Then new navigational 
equipment to be replaced could be followed. 
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3.3 Investigation Tools for Marine Accidents caused by Human Element 
3.3.1 SHEL and Hybrid Models 
The human elements dealt with in the IMO are complex and multi-dimensional 
matters related to every factor which affects human-system interface including social, 
legal, human ability, cultural and health and design factors (Kim H.T., 2012). The left 
Figure 5 is the original diagram of the IMO Casualty Investigation Code, and right 
diagram is an analysis of the IMO's work on the human element in maritime safety, 
which shows a simplified explanation that presents a number of factors that have a 
direct or indirect impact on human conduct and the potential to carry out tasks.  
  
Figure 5: Topics to be covered by Investigation 
(Source: IMO, 1999)                                           (Eriksson, 2003) 
Therefore, the IMO set up guidelines for providing practical support of the systematic 
investigation into human elements in marine accidents and to let the development of 
effective analysis and preventive action be achieved (IMO, 1999, 2007). The SHEL 
Model was introduced to get assistance in analysing the contribution of human 
elements to errors. The author edited Figure 6 by summarizing Appendix 2 of Casualty 
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Investigation Code, and added sub-titles in the boxes so as to present the scope of the 
SHEL Model for reviewing at a glance. 
 
 
Figure 6: SHEL Model 
(Source: Author) 
As shown in Figure 6, the SHEL Model places the target person or end user at the 
centre of the figure because the target person is a central component and interacts with 
software, hardware, the environment and other persons who are peripheral components. 
The occurrence sequence of accident is illustrated in the Hybrid Model30 of Figure 7. 
The aligned cheese holes of each defence wall become the passage of accident 
occurrence. So, even a little change of the walls could defend the accident albeit in the 
                                                 
30 The data collected during an investigation can be organized, using multiple components of the 
modified SHEL model, into a framework surrounding an occurrence template, based upon the Reason 
model. Causal factors, i.e. the unsafe acts/decisions and conditions, are thereby identified. (Source: 
IMO A.884(21) Appendix 1) 
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wrong place at the wrong time. Therefore, the system failure occurs though a series of 
aligned loopholes of each step. It would be natural that preventative measures be ready 
to block the holes as a result of human element investigation.  
 
 
Figure 7: SHEL and Reason Hybrid Model 
(Source: IMO A.884(21) Appendix 1) 
3.3.2 Measures devised to deal with Human Element 
The maritime community has generally focused on training of seafarers, ship design 
and equipment requirements in compliance with the safety standards set in 
international regulations. Therefore, remarkable developments in the field of hardware, 
software, liveware and its relationships were achieved as shown in Figure 8 albeit 
insufficient tools for the UCD.  
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Figure 8: IMO instruments in Ship System and Human Operator 
(Source: Author added blue dotted boxes on Kim H.T., 2012. p.55) 
Figure 8 might present IMO’s typical point of view. However, it would not be enough 
from the viewpoint of marine accident investigators who keep the Investigation Code 
of the IMO. The Code requires that the role of human elements be analysed and 
suggests recommendations concerning human-oriented relationships for depicting the 
broken or loose interface according to the elements of the SHEL Model. The 
investigators should address preventive measures to fill in the found loopholes or to 
recover the damaged interface.  
Hence, Figure 9 based on SHEL Model discloses loose interface between a navigator 
as central component and navigational circumstances as environment. The difference 
between Figure 9 and Figure 10 is the consideration of circumstantial factors called 
“Environment”.  
To summarize four interfaces related to the centred human: 
 First, Liveware-Liveware Interface could be controlled by the STCW. 
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 Second, Liveware-Software Interface could be adjusted by the 
implementation of the ISM Code of the SOLAS.  
 Third, Liveware-Hardware Interface could be addressed by the UCD. 
This sector needs further discussion for QAS by the IMO approval. 
 Last but not least, example instruments of Liveware-Environment 
Interface (LEI) are not found in the IMO level.  
 
 
Figure 9: International Measures in relation to the centred Liveware 
(Source: Author) 
As it has been strongly insisted on to sketch an instance of LEI measures from the 
IMO instruments, the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) could be an example of the 
LEI. The TSS plays a role in reducing risky conditions between a navigator (Liveware) 
and navigational circumstances (Environment) considering the TSS separates head-on 
situations of ships in narrow channels or dense traffic routes. However, the drawing of 
TSS depends totally on individual States. The IMO has not given any instructions or 
guidelines yet for how to draw the TSS, how to audit it or how to maintain it. 
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Conclusively, the LEI would be a new agenda of the IMO and the maritime 
community.  
3.4 Summary on the Selected Approaches to Human Elements 
The IMO has endeavoured to enhance ship’s design, equipment and stability. Often as 
one measure among others, adequate training and certification of seafarers have also 
been emphasized to address the contribution of the human elements to marine 
accidents. 
Supplementary systems on shore that give warning to navigators prior to encountering 
risk at sea would be complementary treatment considering that human errors are not 
totally eradicated by training and certification. The system would be Vessel Traffic 
Service (VTS), Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) 31 , and e-Navigation system. 
Furthermore, objectives to the amelioration of human interference would be 
automation design such as Integrated Bridge System (IBS), Integrated Navigation 
System (INS) or e-Navigation through well-designed HMI. The UCD would be one 
more solution to suppress marine accidents caused by mistake while operating 
shipboard equipment because the UCD is a consideration of end-user friendly design 
from the beginning of a system product. In other words, the design should be 
performed to reduce human errors by accumulating information about end-users and 
reflecting characteristics of end-users (UPA, 2012). Thus, the contemporary maritime 
industry could get benefits from the more sophisticated design taking into account the 
UCD.  
                                                 
31 Recently, the term of VMS is defined by IMO in “Performance standards and functional requirements 
for the long-range identification and tracking (LRIT) of ships” by Resolution MSC.263(84) adopted 
on 16 May 2008 as “a system established by a Contracting Government or a group of Contracting 
Governments to monitor the movements of the ships entitled to fly its or their flag. A Vessel 
Monitoring System may also collect from the ships information specified by the Contracting 
Government(s) which has established it.” 
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Marine accidents can be reduced by one of the aforementioned approaches that might 
be the seafarer himself or interface between seafarer and ship, seafarer and 
management level. The tools were generally originated from the STCW, the ISM Code 
or the HMI studies.  
However, this study found that it needs to assay to portray a number of human aspects 
in marine accidents, relatively to navigational environment. Therefore, the IMO could 
stretch more effort to address any appropriate solutions to deal with the LEI, interface 
between operators or end-users (Liveware) and operating circumstances 
(Environment). The LEI needs to be analysed further, so that it might be 
recommended as a new work reference of the IMO and the international shipping 
community.  
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4 USER-FRIENDLY NAVIGATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses several marine accidents, and debates on the width of main 
pillars of harbour bridges for safe passage of ships in the Republic of Korea. The 
above cases became the background of the new scheme for navigator-friendly design 
of ship’s routeing and port zoning for safe navigation, which could be an example 
measure of dealing with LEI. 
Firstly, the collision between a crane barge Samsung No.1 with a motor tanker Hebei 
Spirit was recorded as the most serious oil pollution in Korea, which could have been 
prevented if there were safe anchorages within harbour limits. It became a direct 
motive to introduce the SPAS. 
Secondly, the allision between the LPG tanker New Wave II with the pier was a near-
miss in terms of huge gas explosion. In addition, the collision between chemical 
tankers Seunghae and Jeongyang will be mentioned. The two accidents were caused 
by poor communication among navigators in a narrow channel. These accidents also 
demonstrated the importance of the LEI matter. 
Lastly, it will mention a controversy between the land road party and the sea road 
party over the span of Incheon Grand Bridge that ended in blocking the passage of 
VLCCs in an approaching channel to the port of Incheon. It also became a case of the 
necessity of scientific and systematic study on ship’s route.  
Analyses of marine accidents are based mainly on final reports of marine accident 
investigations of the KMST. The aforementioned controversy on the harbour bridge 
refers to technical journals and interviews with officials in charge. 
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4.2 Marine Accident 
4.2.1 Collision between a Crane Barge with a VLCC 
Synopsis 
At 07:06 (LT)32 on 7 December 2007, a crane barge Samsung No.1 being towed by 
two tug boats collided with the anchored tanker Hebei Spirit, carrying 260,000 tonnes 
(290,000 short tons) of crude oil at the position of N36° 52′16″, E126° 03′02″. The 
barge was floating free after the cable linking it to the tug snapped short in the heavy 
weather. The collision occurred near the port of Daesan on the West Sea coast of 
Taean33. It was 252° (T)34, 5.1 miles off from the nearest the lighthouse. 
The drifting barge Samsung No.1 hit the motor tanker (M/T) Hebei Spirit nine times at 
the port side of the single hull tanker. Three of the five portside tanks aboard the Hebei 
Spirit were punctured, and 10,900 tonnes (12,547 ㎘) of crude oil leaked into the sea 
(Supreme Court of Korea, 2011).  
Course of the Accident 
On 6 December 2006, M/T HEBEI SPRIT arrived in the vicinity of discharging port. 
The VTS centre informed the VLCC to anchor beyond harbour limits. The VLCC 
anchored at the position of N36° 52′29″, E126° 03′14.5″ with 9 shackles on deck, 8 
shackles in water. It was 4.8 miles off, 255° from the nearest light house and 7 miles 
off from northeast of the TSS. The captain finished with engine (F.W.E) and changed 
navigation watch to anchor watch.  
                                                 
32 Local Time = UTC + 9 hrs. If not otherwise stated all times in the chapter 5 are given in Local time. 
 
33 Vicinity of Taean is known as one of the most beautiful and popular beaches of Korea, where 
includes a national maritime park, many cultivating farms and one of the largest wetland areas of Asia 
 
34 True Course 
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Figure 10: Ship’s Particulars concerning Collision 
(Source: Final Report of the KMST) 
The anchor position was beside main routes to three major ports. The blue lines in 
Figure 11 show the main routes to the ports of Daesan, Pyeongtaek and Incheon. 
 
 
Figure 11: Ships’ Main Routes and Collision Site 
(Source: Author) 
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The VLCC was scheduled to get a pilot on board at 14:00 the next day in order to 
moor to a Single Buoy Mooring (SBM), 20 miles off from the anchored site.  
At about 14:50 on 6 December 2007, a lead towing vessel Samsung T-5 and a 
subsidiary towing vessel Samho T-3 commenced towing a crane barge Samsung No.1 
and an anchor boat Samsung A-1, bound for Samsung Heavy Industry in Geoje Island 
from the construction site of the Incheon Grand Bridge.  
 
 
Figure 12: Towing Fleet 
(Source: White Book of M/T Hebei Spirit Oil Spill, 2011) 
At 22:40, a wind wave advisory warning was issued by the Meteorological 
Administration. However, the towing fleet did not notice the weather report.  
At 23:30, the true course over ground of the towing fleet deviated from 206° to 186° 
because of westerly winds and waves, but the captain did not notice it and handed over 
the watch to the C/O. The speed was 3.5knots. 
At 23:55, the chief engineer of the VLCC completed replacement of a discharging 
valve of number 3 cylinder of the main engine but did not open the cooling water 
valve of number 3 cylinder. 
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At 00:30 on the day of accident, the OOW did not know the deviation of true course, 
and changed helm to autopilot. The towing vessel suffered heavy yawing. The speed 
dropped to about 2 knots. The crane barge Samsung No.1 was drifted to port side due 
to strong winds and waves from starboard side. The true course of the fleet was about 
210° while sailing in zigzag. 
 
 
Figure 13: Line-up of Towing Fleet 
(Source: White Book of M/T Hebei Spirit Oil Spill. 2011) 
At 04:00, the OOW reported the heavy weather to the captain. The captain came on 
bridge and found that the speed was 1.7 knots, and the fleet almost lost the course 
keeping ability. The captain decided to return to the port of Incheon. The fleet drifted 
1 mile to the east while the captain slowed down the speed so as to return to Incheon.  
At 04:44, when the towing vessel turned to starboard, the fleet was pushed to the east.  
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At 05:17, the heading was north but the fleet drifted to the east. So, the captain gave 
up returning to Incheon, and changed the course to the west so as to pull the barge.  
At about 06:00, the OOW of the VLCC noticed that the towing fleet approached 1 
mile off with the speed of 1 knot. The heading of the VLCC was northward.  
At 06:05, the towing fleet drew near 0.7 mile off, and the heading of the fleet was 
westward but drifted towards the south where the VLCC anchored. The fleet was 
approaching slowly to port bow of the VLCC by heavy weather. The captain of the 
tanker anticipated that the fleet might pass abeam portside with CPA 0.3 mile.  
At 06:10, the captain of the VLCC ordered stand-by engine (S.B.E.) and forecastle 
station. At 06:14, while the towing fleet drifted to the south and approached anchored 
Hebei Spirit, the distance became 0.5 mile.  
At 06:17, main engine was ready to use. The captain used the engine several times 
with dead slow astern and stop so as to slack anchor chains for giving more room 
ahead. 
At 06:27, when the anchor chain of the VLCC was slacked 4 shackles more, the 
captain was informed from the VTS centre that the towing fleet had been drifting due 
to restriction in ability to manoeuvre by heavy weather.  
At 06:32, the towed crane barge Samsung No.1 crossed the bow of the VLCC. At 06:40, 
the crane barge passed with the CPA of 0.3 miles off, bearing 340°(T). It was abeam 
of portside of the VLCC.  
At 06:54, tug boat Samsung T-5 moved forward much faster than before because the 
towing line was broken. After a while, the tug boat Samsung T-5 moved back to the 
barge Samsung No.1. The captain of the VLCC noticed it, but did not recognize that 
the towing line was broken at that time.  
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Figure 14: Sketch of the Course based on VTS data 
(Source: Author modified track data of the KMST) 
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At 06:58, the VLCC used slow astern and half astern engine. After a while, the cooling 
water high temperature alarm of No.3 cylinder of main engine sounded35, and the 
R.P.M of the main engine slowed down automatically. So, the VLCC became Not 
Under Command (NUC) condition. 
At 07:04, the main engine recovered. The captain used the main engine with dead slow 
astern, slow astern, dead slow astern and half astern.  
At 07:06, the VLCC was struck by floating free barge Samsung No.1.  
At about 07:28, the captain was reported oil pollution from crews and found crude oil 
leakage from No. 1, 3, 5 cargo tanks. 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Punctures of M/T Hebei Spirit 
(Source: White Book of M/T Hebei Spirit Oil Pollution, 2011) 
 
                                                 
35 M/Eng. #3 Cyl. C.F.W. Outlet. High Temperature Alarm 
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Figure 16: Polluted Beach in Taean 
(Source: Korea Coast Guard, 2007) 
 
Lessons Learned 
The KMST made 11 recommendations to seafarers, ship owners, insurers and safety 
authorities. Most recommendations were about conformity to existing rules and 
regulations on safe navigation and emergency response such as SOPEP 36 . 
Recommendations about human elements were two items; 
 To designate cargo handling officer to alleviate fatigue of navigation 
watch officers, 
 To apply the ISM Code to towing fleets even engaged in domestic 
navigation. 
                                                 
36 Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan,  73/78 MARPOL Annex 1 Chapter 5 rule 37 
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The MLTM submitted revision of the Maritime Safety Act (MSA) to adapt the ISM 
Code to towing the fleet when it sails between domestic ports. However, the fatigue 
reduction action has not been taken yet. 
4.2.2 Analysis 
The KMST publicized the cause and contributing factors of the accident as follows; 
This collision was made by a towing fleet that was composed of towing 
vessels Samsung T-5, Samho T-3, an anchor boat Samsung A-1 and a crane 
barge Samsung No.1. The towing fleet failed to cope early with heavy 
weather, and suffered near loss of maneuverability at sea. However, the 
towing fleet did not warn nearby vessels of the drifting condition, and no 
safety action like anchoring was taken in emergency. The towing wire of 
Samsung T-5 was broken by wind and wave when the towing fleet drifted 
and got close to anchored tanker Hebei Spirit. So the floating free barge 
Samsung No.1 drifted and collided with the anchored tanker HEBEI SPRIT. 
Main cause of the accident was supplied by the towing fleet.  
In addition, negligence of watchkeeping beside the heavy traffic route, 
indolent response of Hebei Spirit led late action for collision avoidance. 
Furthermore, main engine was not ready to be started in urgent situation, 
which is contributing factor of the accident (KMST, 2008). 
Accordingly, human errors intervened in the accident. The captain of the towing vessel 
did not pay proper attention to the weather, and the OOW of the tanker neglected 
watchkeeping. So, the two parties in charge were late in evaluating the approaching 
danger. If the persons in charge performed good seamanship, the accident would not 
have occurred. In that case, preventive measures should focus on how to drive the 
seafarers to perform good seamanship. Therefore, the KMST suggested the application 
of the ISM Code which is a well known preventive measure to human error by 
systematic check.  
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However, the focus of the MLTM was more comprehensive and different from the 
view of the KMST in counter measures for preventing further accidents. The MLTM 
as an authority for safety of maritime traffic, first of all, designated a waiting area far 
beyond the fragile area between main routes and harbour limits because vessels 
navigating through the main routes could drift to the site of the accident again.  
The port of Daesan was constructed beside the main route to the ports of Inchoen and 
Pyeongtaek. Before the inauguration of the port of Daesan in 2007, most cargoes of 
Daesan petro-chemical complex and nearby industrial complex were transferred to the 
port of Incheon or Pyeongtaek for sea transportation (KMOA, 2007). In this context, it 
is regrettable that the port designer did not consider the risk of drifting. If the designer 
viewed the whole traffic system of the region, the port zoning including inner harbour 
anchorage might be differently designed. Therefore, the revision of the MSA included 
a compulsory audit scheme for analysing navigational conditions around ship’s routes 
and port zones (Kim, 2011). 
Nevertheless, the oil pollution of M/T Hebei Spirit was a catalytic initiator rather than 
an original creator of the audit scheme. 
4.2.3 Summary of Marine Accidents 
As determined by the final report of the KMST, even a little drifting could be 
devastating in the wrong place at the wrong time. It was proven in chapter 2.2.2 that 
the denser the traffic is, the higher the danger of accident is. So, port zones and 
confined channels are prone to accidents. The worst oil pollution incident in Korea 
also occurred in one of the busiest zones and main routes to three major ports. 
The MLTM turned attention from seafarers in charge to the accident site considering 
that human errors could not be totally eradicated. Therefore, it would be the case that 
had the tanker not dropped anchor at the position, the collision could have been 
avoided. As a matter of fact, the fully loaded Hebei Spirit could not anchor in the inner 
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harbour of Daesan because there were not enough anchorages for receiving VLCCs. 
Thus the tanker dropped anchor outside of the harbour.  
It showed that design deficiencies led to the failure of systems. So, well designed ports, 
including port zoning, can reduce the human element contribution to the failure of the 
system.   
4.3 Near Miss 
4.3.1 Allision between a LPG Carrier with a Chemical Pier 
At 03:21 on 25 April 2003, the LPG carrier New Wave II (3,244 G/T) struck the LG-
Caltex pier in the port of Kwangyang37. It could have led to a very serious explosion 
because the pier was surrounded by explosive chemical piping, tanks and industry 
complex. It could be classified into a near miss in terms of explosion. 
There were 4 two-way routes within the harbour limits and one special traffic area38 at 
the mouth of the port. As shown in Figure 17, the dotted circle was the most risky area 
in the route No.2, and the width of the two-way route was about 200-250 metres 
without centre separation buoys (KMST, 2004).  
Course of the Allision 
The New Wave II sailed through route No.2 from route No.1 with the full speed of 11 
knots. The visibility was 200-300 metres in rainy weather. The ship was approaching 
the narrow channel of the route No.2 with the course of 270°. The pilot received 
detailed traffic information of the route No.2 from the VTS centre.  
                                                 
37 The port of Kwangyang was one of the fastest developing ports in Korea because it was surrounded 
by world-class chemical industry complex. 
 
38 Deep draft vessels and dangerous goods carriers have priority for course keeping in the Special 
Traffic Area. (Source: MSA article 10) 
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At 03:18, the pilot changed course to 265° and found the LPG carrier Dukyang No.3 
that was 0.3 miles off on the port bow side. In addition, the red light of Daemok No.1 
was first sighted 0.75 miles off on 10° from the starboard bow.  
 
Figure 17: Risky Area of the Port of Kwangyang (Route No. 2) 
(Source: Author) 
At 03:20, the approaching Daemok No.1 was about 150 metres apart. The pilot of New 
Wave II thought that Daemok No.1 might pass by port side (port to port), and asked the 
captain of New Wave II to inform the Daemok No.1. of the pilot’s intention. The pilot 
believed that promise was made for port to port passing. However, the navigation 
lights of the opposite vessel Daemok No.1 was changed from red light to both lights, 
then green light. So, the pilot of New Wave II ordered immediately to steer to hard port. 
The collision was evaded. However, the New Wave II approached the LG-Caltex pier 
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that was 150 metres apart. The pilot ordered hard starboard rudder, full astern engine 
and dropped a starboard anchor.  
At 03:21, the bow of the New Wave II rotated to port side due to the CPP39 and hit the 
pier with the speed of 5 knots by forward inertia.  
Fortunately, the allision damaged only to the shell plate of the New Wave II and 
fenders of the pier. However, if the outbound vessel Dukyang No.3 had left the pier a 
little late, the New Wave II would have collided with the loaded LPG carrier Dukyang 
No.3. The explosion of the two LPG carriers might have induced more serious 
explosion of the LPG piping and the nearby chemical complex.  
Lessons Learned 
Miscommunication between ships led to misjudgement. Misjudgement in narrow 
channels has led to marine accidents. So, unclear communications between ships were 
pointed out as a contributing factor by the KMST, and the VTS centre was advised to 
perform positive intervention to avoid head-on situations in the narrow channel of the 
route No.2 (Mokpo, 2003).  
4.3.2 Accident caused by Miscommunication 
There was another accident between oil tankers at the same route No.2 on 23 
December 2004. The inbound tanker Seunghae suggested that the outbound tanker 
Jungyang should pass the narrow channel first, but the outbound tanker asked the 
inbound ship to enter the channel without hesitation. So the inbound tanker believed 
that the outbound tanker would give way, and the collision occurred in the channel. 
                                                 
39 Most merchant ships are equipped with the Fixed Pitch Propeller (FPP). The bow of the ship rotates 
to starboard side when it uses astern engine. However, the New Wave II was equipped with the 
Controllable Pitch Propeller (CPP). So it moves port side while using stern engine.  
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The accident caused 623 kl of oil leakage into the sea, but early response by the oil 
pollution prevention team stopped the spread of the leakage.  
The regional Maritime Safety Tribunal40 advised that the VTS centre should carry out 
positive intervention in ample time to avoid danger including head-on situations in the 
narrow channel of the route No.2. The seafarers in charge were blamed for human 
errors.  
Finally, the port authority prohibited the two-way passing at the narrow channel41 to 
avoid head-on situations, and the VTS centre commenced designating the order of 
passing the channel. No more accidents have been reported yet after the treatment 
measures.  
4.3.3 Analysis 
The direct cause of the two accidents was miscommunication which is a kind of 
human errors. However, the successfully applied preventative measure was changing 
the two-way route to a one-way route. It could be interpreted that the possibility of 
human error was cured by changing navigational circumstances. Therefore, it would 
not be wise to stick only to training of seafarers or the VTS system to reduce human 
errors.  
4.3.4 Summary on Near Miss  
Similar marine accidents were repeated although the KMST recommended active 
intervention of the VTS. However, the accidents did not happened any more by 
designating the two-way routes as one-way route.  
                                                 
40 The KMST has four regional branches. 
 
41 Notification No. 2004-10 of Yeosu Regional Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Office on 5 March 2004. 
Vessels longer than 35 metres (including towing fleet) are not allowed to pass by in the narrow 
channel of route No.2 day and night without permission of the VTS centre.  
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The treatment measure should be focused on because of the possibility of reducing 
human error due to adjusting navigation environment. In this context, the favourable 
environment that blocks development of human error to marine accident could be 
defined as navigator-friendly circumstances. 
4.4 CONTROVERSY OVER THE SPAN OF HARBOUR BRIDGES 
4.4.1 Introduction  
The day before the oil pollution of the Hebei Spirit, the collided barge Samsung No.1 
was engaged in lifting the longest deck of a harbour bridge between the main pillars of 
the Incheon Grand Bridge. The lifting work was televised nationwide, but the same 
barge was shown again on TV news next day because it struck the VLCC. 
 
Figure 18: The Incheon Grand Bridge crossing the entrance of the port of Incheon 
 (Source: Author added the width of the bridge on Incheon Bridge, 2009) 
The Incheon Grand Bridge was designed to connect the Incheon International Airport 
in Youngjong Island with the Incheon superhighway linked to the capital city, Seoul. 
It shortened the transit time up to one hour from Seoul to the Incheon International 
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Airport. So, it rendered great services to the cost-down of land logistics. It cost a total 
of 1,084 million USD (Incheon Bridge, 2009). 
The total length of the bridge is 21.38Km including 12.34km of a two-way 6-lane 
expressway on the sea. The longest span between the bridge pillars is 800 metres. It 
has a vertical clearance of 74 metres. The bridge can stand ship’s collision of 100,000 
DWT with 10 knots (KMU, 2007).  
4.4.2 Debates between Land Road Party and Sea Road Party 
Construction work was performed from June 2005 to October 2009, although the 
construction contract was signed on September 1999. Two years was consumed for 
deciding the span of the main pillars before finalizing the blue print. The Ministry of 
Construction and Transport (MOCT)42 was interested in fast construction with an 
economic budget. However, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MOMAF) 
did not agree on the span of the bridge because it could be an obstacle to safe 
navigation (Kim, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 19: Outline of the Incheon Grand Bridge 
 (Source: Author added the red arrows and remarks on Incheon Bridge, 2009) 
                                                 
42  According to the reform of the governmental organization of the Republic of Korea, former the 
Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MOMAF) and the Ministry of Construction and Transport 
(MOCT) have unified into the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs (MLTM) in 2008. 
(Source: Author) 
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Generally, the construction parties including land traffic authorities and private 
companies tend to have an economic view point. They focus more on the commercial 
requirements rather than maritime safety, which cause not only risk of maritime traffic, 
but also some severe conflicts between the parties concerned (Lee, 2009). 
The part C of Figure 19 was a matter of argument. The MOCT asked the opinion of 
the MOMAF on two options of the 550 metres and 450 metres’ spans between the 
pillars. However, the MOMAF requested that the span between the main pillars should 
be 700-1000 metres, and the side span should be over 250 metres. The MOCT 
modified the suggestion to 675 metres after ship handling simulations that were 
carried out by the Korea Ocean Institution (KOI)43. Then, the MOMAF demanded two 
main spans of 550 metres. The demand was based on the ship handling simulations 
performed by the maritime universities44 that had been arguing against the study result 
of the KOI because their points of view to safe navigation were basically different 
from that of KOI. Also, the MOMAF did not give any reliability to the simulation 
result of the KOI (Kim, 2009). 
Once, the construction company proposed an alternative plan based on other 
simulations. The span of the main pillars was 675 metres and the side span beside the 
main pillars was 280 metres. However, the MOMAF did not agree on the alternative 
plan. Under the intervention of Vice Prime Minister, it was agreed between the two 
ministries after several times of ministerial meetings that the span of the main pillars 
in the design stage were supposed to be 700 metres taking into account the urgent road 
traffic need, and that a reliable third party institution would perform the ship handling 
simulations to search for risk assessment and safety enhancement (Kim, 2009). 
                                                 
43 The institution produced and operated full mission ship handling simulators. (Source: Author) 
 
44 The university is equipped with Kongsberg full mission ship handling simulators. (Source: Author) 
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So, a well-known Japanese institution carried out the bridge passing simulation more 
than 20 times, and handed in three options with conditions about the span of the main 
pillars. Finally, the cable stayed bridge had five span lengths of 80 metres, 260 metres, 
800 metres, 260 metres and 80 metres (Incheon Bridge, 2009). 
4.4.3 Different Results from Different Conditions 
More than three well-known institutions home and abroad were involved in the ship 
handling simulations but the results were different from one another.  
Regardless of the function of simulators, one of the reasons why the institutions turned 
in different results of the studies could be the consideration of different inputs of the 
weather conditions into the simulators. If wind speeds were strong, the ship would be 
more pushed to the leeward side. When current directions were abeam to the ship’s 
side, the ship would easily deviate from the planned course. Considering that 
simulators are a kind of calculator which renders output answers based on input data, 
the standard input data is as much important as the simulator itself.  
Therefore, every input factor of simulation needs scientific verification for the 
accuracy and social agreement for the model ship. If that was the case that the standard 
of input data should be fixed, the government or any other organization of authority 
should present guidelines for data input in order to confirm reliability of the 
simulations. Moreover, there should be scientific tools to evaluate the safety margin 
for simulation of ship or any other official standards for ship’s routeing (Cho, 2010). 
4.4.4 Side Effect of the Harbour Bridge 
Incheon is the second largest port city in Korea, and most industries in Incheon are 
linked to the port management. The local government of Incheon supported and relied 
on the MOMAF because fluent sea traffic was more important for the further 
development of Incheon.  
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On 19 October 2009, the Incheon Grand Bridge opened to traffic and became the 
landmark of the city of Incheon with the record of the 5th longest bridge among cable 
stayed bridge in the world.   
As studied, the span of the bridge was decided by agreement between the MOCT and 
the MOMAF. The clearance of the bridge did not get any concern. When the bridges 
over the approaching channels were completed, it was found that the empty or fully 
loaded VLCC could not sail in or out from the inner harbour of Incheon45 because the 
model ships chosen for the simulations were 100,000 dead weight tonnage of bulk 
carriers (KMU, 2007). The VLCCs have more air draft than that of model bulk carrier 
and more impulse to the bridge pillars. Moreover, there was one more harbour bridge 
over the northern approaches as shown in Figure 20. 
 
 
⇧ Northern Bridge / ⇩ Southern Bridge 
 
Figure 20: Two bridges surrounding the port of Incheon 
 (Source: Author) 
According to the interview with the official in charge of port management, an oil 
refinery company, SK Energy, tried to hire VLCCs for transporting crude oil to the 
                                                 
45 Author interviewed the official in charge of the port management in 2011. 
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port of Incheon in 2010. However, the port authority could not accept the proposal 
because of vertical clearance of the Incheon Grand Bridge and the strength of 
protective pillars of the bridge that was designed to stand ship’s collision of 100,000 
DWT with 10 knots. The oil refinery company amended its proposal from full loaded 
VLCC to half loaded VLCC in 2001. However, no agreement has been made yet.  
It might be safe to predict that the inner harbour of Incheon could not be used by big 
ships like VLCCs. In addition, recently designed huge ships like 15,000 TEU 
container carriers could not enter the inner port of Incheon, which means the 
development of the city would be limited forever in case that the bridges exist. 
4.4.5 Summary on Controversy over the Span of Harbour Bridges 
The Incheon Grand Bridge was built under the negotiation of two ministries which 
were in charge of land transportation and sea transportation. It took two years to reach 
mutual agreement based on scientific studies, such as ship handling simulations. 
However, the results of scientific studies were different from one another, and they 
were favourable to clients.  
In this regards, the so-called scientific simulations could be fabricated by manipulating 
input data. In case of malice, the anticipated results could be created by editing input 
data. Even in good faith, the categories of input data should be fixed by scientific 
research and social agreement because the two ministries failed to enter the 
perspective of the port development. So, the bridge blocked the passage of VLCCS in 
view of the results so far achieved. 
It could be concluded that the simulation conditions are more crucial points to acquire 
scientific and accurate results than mutual agreement. Moreover, the categories of 
input data are also crucial points for comprehensive and reliable simulation.  
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Two lessons were learned from the debates over the span of the bridge and port entry 
of VLCCs: 
 To standardize the condition of ship handling simulation, 
 To classify subjects for consideration in accordance with category of 
business.  
4.5 Summary on User-Friendly Navigational Circumstances 
Repeated marine accidents could be, sometimes, irresistible consequences when the 
design of ship’s route and port zoning was carried out without scientific consideration 
to safe navigation.  
If rooms for absorbing human errors are given, not a few marine accidents could be 
evaded. In the case of the Hebei Spirit, even a little drifting made devastating result in 
port areas and approaches. In other words, the collision could have been avoided 
unless the VLCC had dropped anchor at the busy water zone. It proved that design 
deficiencies led to the failure of systems considering the Hebei Spirit was not allocated 
to safe anchorage. It would be worth noticing the allision of LPG carrier New Wave II. 
Though the captain was blamed because of human error, the successful preventative 
measure came from modifying navigational circumstance.  
This study demonstratively found that human error as the main cause of marine 
accident might not be eradicated by warning liveware or enhancing software alone. 
The navigational environment could play more practical roles in the matter of human 
error.  
The span between the main pillars of the Incheon Grand Bridge was calculated on the 
basis of scientific simulations. Ship handling simulations had been generally applied to 
analyse the risk factors of navigational circumstance. However, the ministries 
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concerned did not agree on the first draft span because the results of simulations were 
not independent from clients.  
The span of 800 metres between the main pillars of the cable-stayed bridge was finally 
agreed between the two ministries after more than 20 simulations by an independent 
third party. No matter how agreed and simulated, the bridge became an obstacle in the 
near future because VLCCs could not enter the inner port through the bridge. The size 
of the model ship was reflective of current biggest vessels. The future ship considering 
port receptability was not reflected at the table of mutual agreement.  
Especially, taking into account that the same size of ship’s route would be regarded as 
shrinking when the traffic volume increased, vessels became bigger or faster. What is 
known as human error might be, sometimes, evidence not to blame seafarers but to 
urge safety administrations to scrutinize the navigational environment. 
In conclusion, carefully designed or modified ship’s routes and water zones can reduce 
human element contributions to the failure of safety systems. For this reason, the 
design of ship’s routeing and port zoning require scientific research for maritime 
safety. Moreover, the research should be protected and guaranteed by independent 
standards.  
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5 SHIP’S ROUTEING AND PORT ZONING AUDIT SCHEME 
5.1 Introduction 
Navigational risk has been increasing significantly in recent years owing to the 
growing traffic volume and increasing size of ships. In addition, a variety of marine 
facilities such as harbour bridges, SBMs or jetties could be obstacles to safe navigation. 
Those installation and busy traffic could symbolize the economic development. 
However, the development running ahead of safety could result in accidents. As it was 
studied in Chapter 4, one of the best ways to avoid marine accidents caused by human 
elements is relieving or eliminating, if possible, the navigational circumstances that 
are sensitive to human errors.  
Not a few marine investigation reports of the KMST depicted that risky circumstances 
had continuously contributed to near misses or marine accidents. However, the port 
design and water zoning were dealt with by the land-based concept for pursuing fast 
development. Even though maritime safety parties had tried to tackle the construction 
of obstacles in navigable waters case by case retroactively, the deciding power was on 
the land-based parties (Cho, 2010).  
Meanwhile, the oil pollution of M/T Hebei Spirit cast deep impact on the Republic of 
Korea. So the maritime safety parties could stand firm for the needs of reforming 
retroactive procedures. The maritime safety bureau of the MLTM suggested that the 
Marine Safety Act (MSA) be amended to include new maritime safety policies that 
were admitted at the Presidential Meeting46.  
The SPAS was the most outstanding scheme of the amendment. The SPAS was to 
evaluate the maritime traffic safety on port zoning, ship’s routeing and marine facility 
                                                 
46 On February 2008, the Presidential meeting admitted the draft of new safety policy on maritime 
traffic that included the SPAS, prohibition of port entry of single hull tankers etc. (Kim, 2011). 
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construction. The ship handling simulation became a compulsory step and detailed 
guidelines for the condition of simulation were enacted by the law in order to put the 
former controversies on liability to disappear. The amended act47 entered into force on 
28 November 2009 (MLTM, 2009).  
This chapter aims to introduce the examples of safety measures in port zones and 
approaches, comparing the SPAS with existing schemes of major maritime States. The 
concept and procedure of the SPAS will be described to research advantages and 
shortcomings of the SPAS.  
5.2 Examples of Safety Measures in Coastal Waters 
The IMO is recognized as the international body responsible for establishing and 
recommending measures concerning ships’ routeing in international waters (USCG-
NC. 2005). On the other hand, the coastal waters are under the control of coastal States 
(UNCLOS article 2).  
The IMO carries out approval of the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) in international 
waters, although there are no any international schemes or guidelines for checking the 
suitability of ships’ routeing. Some coastal States adapted safety audit systems for the 
safety of coastal navigation. There will be briefly explained to compare with the SPAS 
of Korea. 
                                                 
47 Korean law is divided into three levels (Act -> Enforcement Decree -> Enforcement Rule). The lower 
level laws should have any foundation in the upper level law to be written.  
1. Acts should be passed the review under the National Assembly.  
2. Enforcement Decree should be reviewed by the President.  
3. Enforcement Rule should be screened by the Prime Minister. 
4. Ordinance of Minister can be issued by the Ministers under the mandate of the law. (There are 
several forms of Ordinances, i.e. Notification for people, Directive for government officers, 
Guidelines or Instructions for all.  
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5.2.1 The United Kingdom and Hong Kong 
The UK enforced the Port Marine Safety Code of 2009 that applied to all harbour 
authorities. Basically it uses the Formal Risk Assessment techniques to identify risks 
in harbours and approaches. It aims at maintaining the marine safety management 
system being in place to ensure that all risks are controlled - the more severe ones 
must either be eliminated or kept as low as reasonably practicable (UKD, 2009). The 
Code is generally interested in plans and an assessment of harbour authorities’ 
performance in meeting their obligations at least once every three years.  
Hong Kong kept a similar policy to that of the UK. Hong Kong publicized the risk of 
maritime traffic in its sea area after performing a wide range of strategic research that 
was to survey maritime traffic on the basis of risk evaluation. The standard for risk 
management was ruled by the Hong Kong government (MMU, 2007).  
There is a harbour board for taking responsibility of safety audit. The role of the 
harbour board in the UK and Hong Kong is as important as the audit institutions in 
Korea. However, the Code did not supply any specific technical guidelines for 
auditing the safety system of the target waters or approaches. 
Owing to the maritime traffic system in Hong Kong, there has been no human loss 
casualty in Hong Kong, one of the busiest ports in the world, since 1971 until the crash 
between a ferry and an excursion boat happened on 1 October 2012. Thirty-eight 
passengers died and six crew members were detained. Some maritime experts of Hong 
Kong criticized that increased traffic volume and continued proclamation work along 
the piers changed the navigational circumstances, which requires the review of the UK 
style maritime traffic system (Hwang, 2012). Therefore, new approaches to the safety 
audit system of Hong Kong are expected. 
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5.2.2 The United States of America 
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) 48   holds the authority for ship routeing 
measures such as designation of fairways and fairways anchorages in U.S. waters. The 
USCG operates the Port and Waterways Safety Assessments (PAWSA) under 
authorities of 33 USC. 49 1221 - Port and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, as amended 
by the Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978. The PAWSA aims at providing specific 
results and measures for optimal routeing of ships to, in and from major ports in 
conjunction with all other marine activities occurring in that area. For instance, it is to 
confirm that every fairway and anchorage in fairways might be designated or 
established to provide unobstructed approaches for ship (USCG, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 21: Simplified Overview of the PAWSA Process 
 (Source: USCG-NC, 2005) 
                                                 
48 The United States Code (USC) title 14 and title 33 contain the responsibility of the USCG and 
management of the navigation and navigable waters. The first chapter of 33 Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR), Navigation and Navigable Waters, entitles the USCG to manage maritime safety. 
 
49 The USC enacted by Congress enables the CFR. Regulations of the CFR spell out in further detail 
how the executive branch will interpret the law. (Source: University of Minnesota. FAQ. Retrieved 9 
September 2012 from the World Wide Web: 
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As shown in Figure 21, the PAWSA process is a two-day workshop whose members 
are composed of waterway users, stakeholders, and the agencies/entities responsible 
for implementing selected risk mitigation measures because it is to survey major 
waterway safety hazards, estimate the level of risk related to fairways, evaluate 
potential mitigation measures, and set the stage for enforcement of selected 
preventative measures to decrease risk (USCG, 2012). 
To sum up, the PAWSA could be classified into the expanded harbour board of the 
UK. Although the PAWSA results are collected by a quantitative method using 
spreadsheets for the data collected from each book, the convened group members use a 
qualitative method to fill in the books because they depend on their expertise and 
experience. Computer simulations are not involved in the process. 
5.2.3 Canada 
Canada enforced the Navigable Water Protection Act (NWPA) in 1985. It was lastly 
amended on 12 March 2009. It is composed of 5 parts 50  and has 5 subsidiary 
regulations51 for safe navigation.  
The NWPA has something in common with the SPAS in various ways. First of all, the 
law only aims at navigational safety at navigable waters. Second, the target of the law 
includes most work including construction52 at sea. Third, the minister in charge of 
maritime safety holds the power of approval in every case of work at sea.  
                                                 
50 Part 1: Approval of Works, Part 2: Obstacles and Obstructions, Part 3: Ferry Cables and Swing or 
Draw Bridges, Part 4: Administration & Enforcement, Part 5: Review 
 
51 1) Ferry Cable Regulations, 2) Navigable Waters Bridges Regulation, 3) Navigable Waters Works 
Regulation, 4) Proclamation Exemption the Waters of Sandy Pond from the Operation of Section 22 
of the Navigable Waters Protection Act, 5) Proclamation Exemption Tom MacKay Lake from the 
Operation of Section 22 of the Act 
 
52 “Navigable water” includes a canal and any other body of water created or altered as a result of the 
construction of any work (NWPA article 2) 
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Table 7: Comparison between MSA (SPAS) and NWRA 
Categories  SPAS of Korea  NWRA of Canada 
Title of Act 
Maritime Safety Act 
Enforcement Decree 
Enforcement Rule 
Ordinance of Minister53 
Navigable Water Protection Act 
Five sub‐regulations 
 
 
Enactment  2009  1985 
Purpose 
Professionally  to  inspect,  measure,
evaluate  any  risk  factors  of  the
navigation safety which may affect to
maritime  traffic  safety  and  be
happened  by  the  designated  marine
businesses54  (MSA article 2.16)  
No work shall be built or placed in, on, 
over,  under,  through  or  across  any 
navigable water without the Minister’s 
prior approval of the work,  its site and 
the plans for it (NWPA 5. (1)). 
 
Character 
Specific target business, fixed audit 
items and evaluation method 
Comprehensive target work, 
unspecified audit process 
Weighing  on  independent  and 
impartial  audit  reports  on  the 
business  according  to  specific 
guidelines 
Weighing on navigational safety during 
and  after  the  business  instead  of  the 
business itself 
 
No works  can  be  begun without  the
Minister’s approval 
Minister’s  decision  for  work  is 
imperative 
Informing  related  authorities  and
business owners of the audit result 
Publicizing the approved business to 
local newspapers  
(Source: Author) 
                                                                                                                                             
 
53 Ordinance of Minister can be issued by the Ministers under the mandate of the law. (There are several 
forms of Ordinances, i.e. Notification for people, Directive for government officers, Guidelines or 
Instructions for all. (Source: Author) 
 
54 1) Establishment and change of water area; 2) Construction / attachment or repair of structures such 
as bridge / tunnel / cable, etc. installed in the water area; 3) Development / redevelopment of harbor or 
wharf; and 4) Other business to affect conspicuously to maritime traffic safety as prescribed by 
Ordinance of the Ministry of Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs. 
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The Canadian system is much similar to Korean system. Table 7 shows the similarities 
and differences. However, the NWPA of Canada has many common clauses with the 
SPAS of the MSA, there are no specific guidelines on the audit process and technical 
parts such as simulation standards which Korea and Japan have. 
5.2.4 Japan  
Japan also has a method to evaluate the risk of maritime traffic in harbour areas.  
 
Table 8: Comparison between Korean and Japanese Audit Systems 
Categories  KOREA  JAPAN 
Regulation 
Ordinance of the MLTM  
(Compulsory) 
 
Guidelines  of  the  Marine  Casualty 
Prevention Association  
(Recommendation) 
Aim 
To  secure  navigational  safety  by  removing
risky  factors  caused  by  business  in 
navigable waters 
To  secure  navigational  safety  by 
quantitative  analysis  of  effects 
caused by business on vessel traffic
Target 
business 
Port  construction,  water  zoning.  Traffic 
Separation Scheme, etc. 
 
Port  management  plan,  Facility 
construction,  Maritime  traffic 
system, etc. 
Evaluation 
Target 
Business  outline,  Environmental  elements, 
Navigational  circumstances,  Traffic  survey, 
Diagnosis  of  traffic  characteristics,  Users' 
opinion 
Environmental elements, 
Navigational circumstances, 
Existing facilities, Navigational aids, 
Model vessel 
Evaluation 
Method 
Simulations of Ship handling, 
Berthing/unberthing, Traffic congestion 
Simulations of Ship handling, Traffic 
congestion 
Assessment  Assessment Committee  Consultative Committee 
(Source: Author) 
According to the Port Act article 27, all construction and development work in port 
and approaches should be authorised by port authorities. In addition, though it is not a 
compulsory step, the port authorities ask the opinion of the Japanese Coast Guard. 
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Then the Japanese Coast Guard summons the Marine Accident Prevention Committee 
whose members are experts of the maritime community in Japan (KMU, 2007).  
The auditing process and simulation guidelines are much similar to the Korean system 
as shown in Table 8, but the Japanese guidelines are on a voluntary basis.  
5.3 Summary of Examples of Safety Measures in Coastal Waters 
In cases of the UK, Hong Kong and the USA, the safety schemes rely on the expertise 
and experience of the participants of safety audits, whatever their titles are. In addition, 
the stakeholders are invited to the audit meetings so that the impartiality of the audit 
result could be controversial because the audit result depends generally on the 
participants and they could try to negotiate for mutual agreement. Then, the final 
safety measures might be minimized more than expected by navigators. On the other 
hand, once the agreement is made, it would be easy to enforce the new safety schemes 
according to the result of audit because all parties concerned participated in the audit.  
Though the stakeholders participate in the course of audit in Korea and Japan, their 
roles are confined to certain steps of the audit process. The stakeholders’ contention 
could be checked by computer simulations. Especially, as the simulation standards are 
already fixed for how to identify risk factors, estimate, evaluate and finalize for 
recommendations. So, scientific research could be used to persuade the stakeholders 
who do not agree on certain matters. Moreover, the final decision is made without 
stakeholders. So, it would better to induce stronger measures for maritime safety.  
Every State must have chosen its best policy for navigational safety in coastal waters 
according to their historical background. In terms of independency of auditing, the 
Korean system might be one of the most scientific and objective systems because 
auditing procedures are already fixed and collected data are processed by quantitative 
tools like computer simulations.   
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5.4 Overview of the SPAS 
5.4.1 Background 
Even though the legalization of the SPAS was expedited by the tragedy of M/T Hebei 
Spirit, the scheme had already been studied before the tragedy. 
On October 2007, the Mokpo National Maritime University (MMU) completed the 
study for a draft framework of safety impact assessment in maritime traffic. The study 
was initiated by the maritime safety bureau of the MOMAF because retroactive steps 
for ensuring navigational safety in coastal waters were not enough to prevent human 
error evolving into accidents in heavy traffic zones. In addition, on December 2007, 
the Korea Maritime University (KMU) carried out the study on the draft guidelines for 
the bridge construction crossing harbours or harbour entrances. The study was 
financially supported by the Port Logistics Bureau of the MOMAF because the bureau 
also had been anticipating standard steps against several bridge construction plans 
made by local governments and even the construction bureau of the MOMAF. 
These two studies aimed at ensuring safe navigation in busy maritime zones from the 
view point of navigational safety and port efficiency. The SPAS was reported to the 
Presidential meeting of Korea as one of the safety policies following the oil spill of 
M/T Hebei Spirit. 
5.4.2 Concept of the SPAS 
The SPAS is a compulsory formal safety assessment scheme for maritime traffic 
safety55. The scheme is a systematic process for estimating and identifying potential 
risks associated with marine development, and for providing opportunities to improve 
                                                 
55 The purpose of the SPAS is to prevent marine accident and to promote efficient traffic (MSA article 1, 
2). 
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traffic safety. Therefore, the task of SPAS is practically to identify potential hazards 
from the early stage of design which might affect safe navigation, and to suggest all 
possible measures to eliminate or mitigate those risks (Cho, 2009). 
The definition of the audit scheme is in the 2nd article of the MSA. It states that the 
audit is a professional survey, measurement and evaluation of the hazards that may 
occur at sea by the following type of work: 
 Setting up or modification of water zone; 
 Construction or maintenance of bridges, tunnels or cables in water; 
 Development and redevelopment of harbours and ports; and 
 Any projects designated and announced by the Minister of the MLTM as 
remarkably sensitive to maritime traffic. 
Conclusively, the audit scheme should be applied to almost all the marine type of 
work except special cases like emergency restoration service at sea56. 
5.4.3 Auditing Institutions  
For the purpose of reliable and independent auditing, there are four official auditing 
institutions that are equipped with two facilities of a three dimensional full mission 
ship handling simulator, and a minimum of eight qualified auditors57. The registered 
institutions are, at present, the Mokpo National Maritime University58, the Maritime & 
Ocean Engineering Research Institute59, the Korea Maritime University60, and the 
                                                 
56  MSA article 16 
57 MSA article 19, Enforcement Rule of the MSA article 15 
58 Refer to the World Wide Web: http://www.mmu.ac.kr/ 
59 Refer to the World Wide Web: http://www.kordi.re.kr/  
60 Refet to the World Wide Web: http://www.hhu.ac.kr/ 
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Institute of Maritime and Fisheries Technology 61 . The four institutions are 
independent of design or construction companies.  
5.4.4 Overall Process 
The SPAS is required to commence when a project owner plans to build marine 
facilities like bridges over sea routes, or to designate navigable waters as navigation 
prohibited zone like anchorage or marine protected area.  
 
Figure 20: Administrative Procedure of the SPAS 
 (Source: SPAS Guidelines of the MLTM, 2010) 
As shown in Figure 20, project owners ought to ask registered audit institutions to 
make the audit report on their draft drawings. Then, the audit institution performs 
auditing according to guidelines of the MLTM. The audit report should be passed the 
Assessment Committee of the MLTM.  
                                                 
61 Refet to the World Wide Web: http://www.seaman.or.kr/ 
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It is completely self-governing market system because the auditing institutions 
compete with each other to contract with project owners who consider the balance 
between quality of the audit result and budget to be invested. Although projects 
owners are interested in minimum cost for maximum profit, the quality of audit report 
is not negligible because the project cannot be approved by the Minister of the MLTM 
when the audit result is decided as “poor” by the Assessment Committee (Cho, 2010). 
5.4.5 Auditing Process 
When the auditing institutions set to work, they keep track of designated four steps as 
illustrated in figure 21. 
 
 
Figure 21: Auditing Process 
 (Source: SPAS Guidelines of the MLTM, 2010) 
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various systems such as VTS, AIS, VMS, LRIT and the data exchange system of 
GICOMS62, but they have to visit and check the target region actually by radars or any 
other traffic gauging equipment according to the guidelines on the SPAS of the 
MLTM. 
The auditors analyse the traffic patterns and receive opinion of seafarers who have 
sailed in the region. Then, auditors assess the risks using full mission ship handling 
simulators with the help of active captains and pilots. The conditions of ship handling 
simulation are already standardized by the Guidelines of the SPAS. For example, the 
input wind speed should be prevailing wind direction and speed which should be 
maximum instantaneous wind, maximum wind, and average wind63.  
The audit institution holds minimum 3 meetings to ask the opinions of experts and 
stakeholders. The auditor records, classifies and evaluates all the opinions taking into 
account navigational safety and the additional burden of development expenditure. In 
this course, the SPAS showed an unexpected advantage in harmonizing the opinions 
of the stakeholders. For instance, when the new port project is under consideration, 
pilots, port managers and construction companies might have different opinions. The 
project owner generally might be interested in saving budget. The pilots might want 
wider routes, and the port management authority might require wide berths. It took 
several years to reach mutual agreement before the SPAS, which led to the 
squandering of the social resources. However, it was not easy for the stakeholders 
including project owners to argue against the result of independent and scientific 
                                                 
62 General Information Centre on Maritime Safety and Security (GICOMS) is to provides a general 
picture for all Korean ships regardless of their location in the world and for all ships in Korean waters 
on the basis of Geographic Information System (GIS).  Moreover, the GICOMS is to share information 
between related governmental agencies. (Ankwang, 2011) 
 
63 Guidelines on the SPAS article 14.1 
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simulations. The total period of the project was short, which decreased the loss of 
opportunity cost. 
Finally, the audit institution reports the validity of the draft drawing to the project 
owner. If needed, the two parties consult with each other to edit original drawings to 
reduce risks at sea under minimum additional expenditure. 
The final report of audit is supposed to be laid before the MLTM for approval.  
5.4.6 Approval of the Audit Report 
The Assessment Committee are convened by the Minister of MLTM so as to evaluate 
the quality of the submitted audit report64. The Committee is composed of over 20 
experts such as delegates from the Marine Officers’ Association, the Pilots’ 
Association, the Shipowners’ Association and the Ship Classification Societies 65 , 
professors who teach nautical science or port management, government officials in 
charge of maritime traffic or port operations, marine accident investigators. 
Stakeholders are not permitted to join the Committee, although several participants 
come from stakeholders’ organizations, and they are from the safety division of the 
organizations.  
The evaluation results made by the Committee should be notified to the project owner 
with a review opinion. When the assessment result is decided as a poor audit, the audit 
institution should replenish the final report of audit to supplement deficiencies with 
safety measures for eradicating circumstantial factors of potential maritime accidents66. 
                                                 
64 Guidelines of the SPAS article 28. 
65 There are two classification societies in Korea. Korean Register of Shipping (KR) and Korea Ship 
Safety Technology Authority (KST). 
66 Guidelines of the SPAS articles 23-24. 
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Also, the target business like bridge construction cannot be launched until the final 
report passes the Committee67. 
Table 9 shows assessment items that have to be performed in detail by auditors. It 
means that the Assessment Committee would check whether the audit institution 
carried out the assessment items regarding business types in the vertical axis of Table 
9. The upright axis presents the target business of audit, and the horizontal axis lists 
the scope of the audit. The mark “●” in the table should be performed for each target 
business.  
 
Table 9: Assessment Items regarding Business Types 
Audit item 
Target business 
Survey of 
traffic 
state 
Measurement 
of traffic 
state 
Ship handling simulation 
Safety 
measuresNavigational 
Safety 
Berth/ 
Unberth Mooring
Traffic 
Flow 
Water  
zone 
Designation ● ● ● △ ― △ ● 
Change ● ● ● △ ― ― ● 
Facility  
in water 
zone 
Construction ● ● ● △ △ ● ● 
Repair ● ● ● ― ― ― ● 
Harbor 
/Port 
Development ● ● ● ● ● △ ● 
Redevelop- 
ment ● ● ● ● ● ― ● 
Other business appointed 
by the MLTM ● ● ● △ △ △ ● 
● : Mandatory, △ : Recommendable on occasion 
(Source: Guidelines of the SPAS) 
                                                 
67 MSA article 18. 
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When it comes to technical details, the chief of the Maritime Safety Institution of the 
Ship Safety Technology Authority becomes the Secretary of the Assessment 
Committee.  
The Secretary checks the technical parts of the audit report. For example, the 
minimum width of the traffic lane should conform to “Guidelines on Port Design of 
Korea”. If needed, the Rules of PIANC68 and USACE69 are referred to. Furthermore, 
the validity of the lane width should be verified by ship handling simulations. So, the 
Secretary ascertains what kinds of input data are used in simulations. In case of wind, 
it should be prevailing wind direction and speed which are maximum instantaneous 
wind, maximum wind, and average wind70. The Secretary reports the survey results to 
the Assessment Committee to help decision of Committee members.  
5.5 Analysis of the SPAS 
5.5.1 Advantages of the SPAS 
The SPAS might be a turning point in dealing with human elements in heavy traffic 
zones because it is a practice of mental switchover to the human element, which 
declares that human error could not be evolved to marine accidents by the 
enhancement of circumstantial factors.  
At the first stage of formulating the scheme, the SPAS was regarded as one more red 
tape by the business owners who were afraid of an increase in total budget and 
business duration. However, several deadlocked businesses could be commenced by 
the audit scheme which induced mutual agreement among stakeholders by scientific 
                                                 
68 Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses 
 
69 United States Army Corps of Engineers 
 
70 Guidelines on the SPAS article 14.1 
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and objective auditing. Currently, the construction and development parties welcome 
the scheme because it heightened the probability of estimation. So, the new scheme is 
evaluated as reasonable procedure in the project of marine development of Korea. 
Furthermore, it is expected that the new scheme contributes not only to maritime 
safety but also to efficient port management and economic port construction, which 
may bring great benefits to the whole maritime industry.  
Conclusively, it is expected that well designed sea routes, where the emergent cases 
are anticipated, could diminish potential risks, and would result in enhancement of 
maritime safety. The advantages and potential benefits obtained by the implementation 
of the SPAS are as follows. 
 Ship's passage becomes safer, and the efficiency of port management 
could be maximized by reducing or eliminating risky factors. 
 The overall risks that the safety authority should confront could be 
decreased. It would induce savings of administrative burden such as 
accident-related efforts and expenditure. 
 Port designers will pay active attention to the safety of navigation, and the 
design technology considering maritime safety could be improved in self-
governing market.  
 Project owners would not hesitate to accept the new audit system because 
the whole duration of business could be pre-estimated and audit 
institutions would make alternative proposals to shorten the business 
duration and change design with minimum additional expenditure. 
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5.5.2 Shortcomings of the SPAS 
The SPAS entered into force on 28 November 2009 and it is one of the most scientific 
and objective measures. Even though the SPAS was inaugurated successfully in Korea, 
the system is not fully verified yet due to lack of experience through trials and errors. 
With a view to the technological advances in ship handling simulation as a crucial 
process of the SPAS, it shows that the audit system requires constant research to 
develop audit application for devising and verifying technical standards at this initial 
phase, so that more objective and scientific improvements can be achieved. To realize 
and achieve the ultimate goal of the SPAS, all possible knowledge and techniques 
related to auditing should be examined in such audit system.  
However, several shortcomings could be analysed in comparison with audit schemes 
of other industries.   
The first compulsory assessment scheme of Korea was the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) by the Environment Protection Act of 1977. The instrument became 
one of the most important measures to maintain sustainable development. However, it 
has been criticized that most EIA reports were not easy to understand for stakeholders 
and they were perfunctory and written in the same way, which could not prove their 
effectiveness because of feeble post-management (National Assembly, 2012). The 
Ministry of Environment prepared for amendments of the related law in order to 
introduce a port-management scheme and examination of an auditor's qualifications 
(Hwan-Kyung Ilbo, 2012).  
Post-Construction Audit 
In accordance with the Traffic Safety Act of Korea, there are three types of audits. 
Normal audits are basically performed in the design phase, and inauguration and 
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operation phases as well. Furthermore, the special audits could be performed when 
traffic accidents frequently occurred71 at the audited area.  
The SPAS recognizes a preliminary audit. It does not have the concept of post-
construction audit. The result of the preliminary audit depends generally on 
simulations, but the simulations do not perfectly reflect real sites from time to time. 
Therefore, it would be helpful to introduce the post-construction audit to verify the 
similarities and differences between the simulated virtual environment and constructed 
real site, which might enhance the simulation conditions in the long run. In the process 
of the post-audit, the navigators’ opinion who participated in the preliminary audit 
should be gathered and reflected regularly. The feedback would be helpful for the 
enhancement of the SPAS. 
In terms of audit expenses, the project owners are in charge of the preliminary auditing 
expenses because they need auditing. When it comes to special audits after installation 
of facilities, the project owners already completed the projects, so they would not 
intend to bear additional burden. It is suggested that the effort to establish new funds 
might be desirable in cooperation between the government and the audit institutions, 
because audit institutions may bear the results of preliminary audits and primary 
beneficiaries in the enforcement of the audit scheme, and the government might hold 
ultimate responsibility for safety and another beneficiary of reduced marine accidents.  
Starting Point of Audit 
The sooner the audit is carried out, the safer the results are taken, and the less it costs 
(U.S. Department of Transportation, 2006). Specific outset timing for audits has not 
been stated in the MSA72. Therefore, it is not certain when the audit should begin. 
                                                 
71 Traffic Safety Act article 36 
72 MSA article 15 (Maritime Traffic Safety Diagnosis) (1) Any person who intends to perform a 
diagnosis required business (hereinafter referred to as the "Businessman") shall execute a maritime 
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It could cost beyond the allotted budget for change of blue print just before the 
construction phase. That is, it would be more beneficial to edit blue the print through a 
feasibility study in the pre-design or design stage. Also, it would be more 
recommendable to edit the blue print through a feasibility study in the pre-design stage, 
and the audit contract between audit institution and project owner should be divided 
into two parts. The first part will be a feasibility study for auditing at the pre-design 
stage. The second part will be the remaining formal risk assessment at the design stage. 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Phase Model 
 (Source: Cho summarized Durth & Bald, 1987) 
In particular, as shown in Figure 22, the ideal condition does not need a safety audit. 
The second phase of error condition would become a starting point of a safety audit. If 
the phase lasts, it would be expected that the frequency of marine incidents would rise 
(Cho, 2011).  
                                                                                                                                             
traffic safety diagnosis in accordance with the diagnosis criteria as prescribed by Ordinance of the 
Ministry of Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs. 
  
74 
 
It should be the principle to perform an audit before detailed design. This is because 
the earlier the audit is carried out, the more efficient and economic it can be in terms 
of safety and cost.  
Expansion of audit institutions  
There are four registered audit institutions in Korea. They do not keep the balance 
with the number of target businesses because more than 50 bridges connecting main 
land and island, or island and island are scheduled to be launched in the near future 
according to the official in charge of national road management division of the MLTM. 
Furthermore, marine parks, piers for international passenger ships, and port renewal 
projects along the coast line are under consideration by local governments. 
Furthermore, when a big marine project is announced, bids are invited for the design 
and construction. Many companies or consortiums may require the help of audit 
institutions. Therefore, the number of audit institutions should be equivalent to project 
number.  
In detail, the auditing institutions should be equipped with two mock-up bridge 
systems for the three dimensional full mission ship handling simulators73 and eight 
qualified experts. Most marine institutions and training centres of shipping companies 
have qualified simulators. So the equipment requirements do not matter for 
registration. However, expert qualification requires quite high standards. There are 
three classes of auditors. To be a first class auditor, 4 year audit experience is required 
as a holder of 2nd class deck officer certificate or doctor’s degree related to maritime 
safety. There are less than 20 first class auditors in Korea. Therefore, the examination 
for auditor's qualification should be considered to cultivate experts in relatively short 
time.  
                                                 
73 The institution should have traffic flow gauging and analysis equipment (Enforcement Rule of the 
MSA article 15)  
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International Cooperation 
Even though the simulation method is a scientific tool, many other skills can be 
utilized for identifying risk factors in coastal waters. Japan is a State that uses 
simulation skills in the course of port design. First of all, a bilateral meeting between 
two neighbouring States would be beneficial to improve auditing skills. In addition, 
the ship handling or port design societies of the world could be invited to share their 
knowledge and techniques.  
Finally, keeping in mind that the international routeing has been dealt with by the Sub-
Committee on Safety of Navigation (NAV), the Committee might require the audit 
result of the proposed routeing for approval. In this case, the technical guidelines of 
the SPAS would contribute to devising the IMO guidelines for auditing of ships’ route. 
5.6 Summary of the SPAS  
Coastal States maintain legal instruments for safe navigation in ports and coastal 
waters. Some States operate experts groups to identify risk factors and evaluate 
potential mitigation measures, which are managed by the government. Other States 
cultivate private audit institutions to be utilized by the business market.  
In 2009, the Korean Government enforced an audit scheme for ship’s routeing and 
port zoning. The character of the audit scheme compared to the other states’ measures 
lies in the fact that it is a mandatory set of rules and regulations according to the 
Maritime Safety Act. Furthermore, it presents specific guidelines for audit procedure, 
data collecting and data input of ship handling simulators. The stakeholders participate 
in the course of audit, but their opinions might be checked by scientific analyses using 
simulations. Therefore, the deviation of audit reports might be slight, so the final 
report would be objective and reliable.  
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The final audit report should pass through a quality check by the Assessment 
Committee that is managed by the government. Therefore, the SPAS has a double 
check system. It implies that more objective and stronger safety measures can be 
adopted. Conclusively, the characteristics of the SPAS can be summarised as a 
scientific and objective audit scheme working in a self-governing market to deal with 
human error in heavy traffic zones.  
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6 CONCLUSIONS  
Modern vessels have become significantly bigger or faster to achieve economies of 
scale, which have been burdens on fairways that had been used for traditional vessels. 
Moreover, the feasibility of marine accidents became higher in coastal waters as the 
increasing installation of marine structures and continuing port development. 
Navigators should pay more attention to the route which held heavy traffic. However, 
from the view point of accident prevention, blaming navigators to be the cause of 
marine accidents could be inadequate because a navigator-friendly environment might 
fill in the risky holes of a safety system. 
In this context, the author examined the statistics of marine accidents because statistics 
on causes of marine accidents are a key to preventative measures. Also, without the 
positions of accidents, it would not be possible to conduct effective enforcement of 
limited administrative power. It was confirmed that the human element had played a 
significant role in provoking marine accidents. About 80% of the causes of marine 
accidents were human errors such as slips, lapses, mistakes and violations. In addition, 
over 70 % of mishaps occurred in coastal waters like port zones and approaches. To 
sum up, the vast majority of marine accidents occurred in coastal waters by human 
errors. The result implied that maritime safety policy for reducing human error or 
changing the route from human error to marine accident in coastal waters should be 
the main concerns of safety management parties.  
The IMO has approached the issue of maritime safety from a predominantly technical 
point of view. The conventional solutions have been to apply engineering and 
technological answers to promote safety and to minimize the consequences of marine 
accidents. Accordingly, safety standards have primarily addressed ship’s strength, 
stability and equipment requirements. Despite these technical innovations, very 
serious marine accidents have continued to occur. Hence, the IMO has shown interest 
in adequate training and certification of seafarers in order to address the contribution 
of the human element to marine accident. Considering that human-oriented accidents 
  
78 
 
are not totally eradicated by training and certifications, a supplementary system on 
shore such as VTS and VMS that give warning to navigators prior to encountering risk 
became a complementary treatment.  
In addition, the ISM Code of the IMO became a conspicuous instrument regarding the 
combination of human element with safe navigation and management matters because 
it required systematic approaches on risky working conditions. Furthermore, the UCD 
could be one more solution to suppress marine accidents caused by operators’ mistake 
because the UCD is a consideration of an end-user friendly design from the beginning 
of the system product. The UCD should be applied in the integrated bridge project of 
the IMO and future navigational equipment. 
To verify that the aforementioned safety measures are corresponding to all categories 
of human errors, the Marine Casualty Investigation Code was referred to because it 
was developed to identify the categories of human errors. It was found that the IMO 
could contribute further to preparing any appropriate measures to deal with the loose 
interface between liveware and the environment, in other words, navigators and 
navigational circumstances. 
In detail, several marine accidents caused by human errors were examined to look into 
the relationship between operator and operating environment. It was analysed that 
recurrence of marine accidents could be irresistible consequences when artificial 
circumstances of navigation such as ship’s routeing and port zoning were designated 
without scientific consideration to safe navigation.  
In case of the Hebei Spirit, even a little drifting made a devastating result under a low 
tolerance environment to human error. In the case of the LPG carrier New Wave II, the 
successful preventative measure came from modifying the navigational circumstances 
such as changing the two-way route to the one-way route. Conclusively, the 
navigational environment could play a more practical role in the matters of human 
error in terms of preventative measures.  
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As a scientific tool of navigational risk detection, ship handling simulation was 
utilized in Korea. However, the case of the Incheon Grand Bridge showed that the 
input data was imperatively important for reliable results. In addition, taking into 
account that the same size of ship’s route would be regarded as shrinking when the 
traffic volume increased, as vessels became bigger or faster, the future circumstances 
should be anticipated in choosing standards of a model ship and data input. 
Additionally, the legal framework of several maritime States on coastal navigation 
management was analysed. In cases of the UK, Hong Kong and the USA, the safety 
schemes relied on the expert group including stakeholders. Japan maintained computer 
simulation methods for risk assessment in addition to the expert group meeting. 
Canada is equipped with a powerful law which endowed the minister in charge of 
maritime safety with authorities for approval of marine work including constructions 
at sea.  
The Korean Government has actively introduced various safety measures to enhance 
navigational safety in coastal zones since the biggest oil pollution in 2007. As one of 
the new measures, the audit scheme on ship’s routeing and port zoning was activated 
in 2009 to provide a better environment for navigators in coastal zones. The SPAS 
could be a mixture of merits from audit schemes of major maritime States. The 
foundation act is as powerful as that of Canada. The audit results are produced through 
an independent scientific process like Japanese system. The experts concerned are 
invited to the audit meetings like the UK and US cases.  
The characteristics of the SPAS lies in the fact that it is a mandatory set of rules and 
regulations including specific guidelines for audit procedure, simulation process and 
technical details, which enable the system to work independently in a self-governing 
market. Hence, the deviation of audit reports might be minimised, and the final report 
would be objective and reliable. Additionally, the SPAS was proven that it was not 
one more red tape, as it has shorten the time for mutual agreement among stakeholders 
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because the system worked on the basis of its independency and objectivity in a self-
governing market.  
For the enhancement of the mandatory audit scheme of Korea, and attempting to 
introduce the SPAS to the international maritime community, the author is of the 
opinion that the following issues should be considered.  
Firstly, the post-construction audit should be considered with a view to the frequency 
of the audit. As reviewed in Chapter 5.5, when traffic accidents frequently occurred, 
the additional special audit should be performed. The comparison and survey between 
the simulated virtual environment and constructed real site would contribute to the 
improvement of the SPAS. 
Secondly, the specific outset timing for audit should be designated. It would be more 
beneficial to edit the blue print in the pre-design stage, and the audit contract between 
audit institutions and project owners should be divided into two parts. The first part 
will be a feasibility study for auditing at the pre-design stage. The second part will be 
the remaining formal risk assessment at the design stage.  
Thirdly, the examination for an auditor's qualification should be considered to 
cultivate experts in relatively short time. At present, the number of audit institutions 
does not keep the balance with the quantity of the target business. The qualification of 
experts became an admission barrier because it requires quite long experience with 
related certificates and academic degrees. Therefore, qualifying examination is 
recommendable for securing auditors. 
Lastly, international cooperation would accelerate the improvement of the audit skills 
including simulation techniques. It is recommendable to start from bilateral meetings 
between States that possess similar schemes, and to proceed to multilateral meetings, 
and then to reach the IMO level. The NAV of the IMO might deal with the technical 
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guidelines of the SPAS for applying the skills to approving international routeing of 
ships.  
In conclusion, the SPAS might be a turning point in dealing with the human element in 
marine accidents because it does not focus on the ability of seafarers who are not free 
from human error, but aims at enhancing safety margins between navigators and the 
navigational environment. In addition, the SPAS system should be evaluated and 
upgraded continuously in line with the progress of the development of scientific tools 
and navigators’ needs. All requirements for auditing adopted by maritime States 
should be scrutinized for enhancement and application to the SPAS system to cut links 
between human error and marine accidents, or make it flexible enough to compensate 
human error in error enforcing zones. 
*** 
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